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ARTICLE
Hybrid Entity Mismatches: Exploring Three Alternatives
for Coordination
Leopoldo Parada*
The OECD pragmatic approach regarding hybrid entity mismatches is, without doubt, questionable. However, equally questionable is the absence
of alternatives solutions proposed by either academics or tax policy makers , which demonstrates a sort of conformism as regards both the diagnosis of
the problems and the solutions thereto, as if matching tax outcomes and taxing income somewhere – no matter where – were indeed the only possible
path to deal with hybrid entity mismatches.
In an attempt to break this inertia, this article argues for coordination in the tax characterization of entities as a straightforward and
suitable alternative to replace the current OECD linking rules, and perhaps also, the consequentialist OECD approach to hybrid entity mismatches.
For this purpose, three specific alternatives are explored for coordination in the tax characterization of entities, which include (1) supremacy of the
tax characterization rules of the source state, (2) supremacy of the tax characterization rules of the residence state and (3) supremacy of the tax
characterization rules of the home state. The analysis of these alternatives includes both hypotheticals and specific examples from domestic and
supranational laws that are used to illustrate and support their effectiveness. The ultimate aim of this article is to demonstrate that coordination in
the tax characterization of entities appears to be not only a more preferable path when compared to the OECD approach of matching tax outcomes,
but also a more coherent and less costly alternative for both taxpayers and tax administrations.
1 INTRODUCTION
The OECD pragmatic approach regarding hybrid entity
mismatches is, without doubt, questionable.1 Indeed, since
the OECD Base Erosion and Profit Splitting (BEPS) Action
2 Final Report was issued,2 the approach of matching hybrid
entity transactions and double non-taxation has gained
ground, even though no certainty exists as to whether these
two elements are necessarily interconnected or as to whether
they should serve each other in the design of domestic anti-
hybrid entity provisions.3 Nevertheless, equally question-
able is the lack of serious alternative solutions proposed by
either academics or tax policy makers,4which demonstrates a
sort of conformism as regards both the diagnosis of the
problems and the existing solutions thereto, as if matching
tax outcomes and taxing income somewhere – no matter
where – were indeed the only possible path.5
In an attempt to break this inertia, this article argues for
coordination in the tax characterization of entities as a more
Notes
* Doctor in Laws and LL.M. in international taxation, is a postdoctoral research fellow at IBFD in Amsterdam and a visiting professor of international tax law at the
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1 For a recent critical review of the OECD approach to hybrid entity mismatches and the OECD linking rules, see L. Parada, Hybrid Entity Mismatches and the International Trend
of Matching Tax Outcomes: A Critical Approach, 46 Intertax 12 (2018). For a critical perspective, see also e.g. G. Cooper, Some Thoughts on the OECD’s Recommendations on Hybrid
Mismatches, 69(6/7) Bull. Int’l Tax’n (2015); J. Lüdicke, ‘Tax Arbitrage’ with Hybrid Entities: Challenges and Responses, 68(6/7) Bull. Int’l Tax’n (2014).
2 OECD, Neutralising the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements – Action 2: 2015 Final Report, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project (OECD Publishing 5 Oct.
2015). See also OECD, Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (OECD Publishing 2013). For an early analysis of the OECD BEPS Report, see Y. Brauner, BEPS: An
Interim Evaluation, 6(1) World Tax J. (2014).
3 For a specific analysis of the interaction between double non-taxation and the use and misuse of hybrid and reverse hybrid entities, see L. Parada, Double Non-Taxation and the
Use of Hybrid Entities: An Alternative Approach in the New Era of BEPS, (Kluwer Law International 2018). For a very notable and complete analysis of double non-taxation in
the European Union, see C. Marchgraber, Double Non-Taxation and EU Law, Eucotax Series vol. 57 (Kluwer Law International, 2017).
4 However, there are exceptions to coordination and harmonization regarding the tax characterization of entities. E.g. Fibbe has proposed (specifically in the context of the European
Union) a uniform classification method in the EU by mutually recognizing the tax classification of an entity in its host country. This method is based on the principle of mutual
recognition of entities reinforced by the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ)’s holding in Columbus Container Services. Fibbe’s proposal would be materialized in an EU
Directive. For the detailed proposal, see G. Fibbe, EC Law Aspects of Hybrid Entities, vol. 15, Doctoral Series, 293–384 (IBFD 2009). See also DE: ECJ, 6 Dec. 2007, Case C-298/05,
Columbus Container Services B.V.B.A. & Co. v. Finanzamt Bielefeld-Innenstadt, ECLI:EU:C:2007:754. For a proposal more along the line of coordination, see Parada, supra n. 3, at 353–
398. This proposal for coordination is analysed later in this article. See s. 3.3. For an analysis of this proposal and its implications under tax treaties, see L. Parada, Hybrid Entities and
Conflicts of Allocation of Income Within Tax Treaties: Is the New Article 1(2) OECD Model [Article 3(1) MLI] the Best Solution Available?, 3 Brit. Tax Rev. 335–340, 335–376 (2018).
5 For the debate on single taxation, see R. Avi-Yonah, International Tax as International Law: An Analysis of the International Tax Regime 8–13 (Cambridge University Press
2007). See also R. Avi-Yonah, International Taxation of Electronic Commerce, 52(3) Tax L. Rev. 507 (1997). Supporting this idea, e.g. H. Ault, The Importance of International
Cooperation in Forging Tax Policy, 26 Brook. J. Int’l L. 1, 1693 (2001); H. Ault, Some Reflections on the OECD and the Sources of International Tax Principles, 70(12) Tax Notes
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straightforward and suitable alternative to replace the current
OECD linking rules, and perhaps also, the consequentialist
OECD approach to hybrid entity mismatches. For this pur-
pose, three alternatives are explored for coordination in the
tax characterization of entities. The analysis ultimately aims
at demonstrating that coordination appears to be not only a
more preferable path when compared to the OECD approach
of matching tax outcomes, but also a more coherent and less
costly solution for both taxpayers and tax administrations.
Section 2 delimits the scope of this article. Section 3
analyses three alternatives for coordination in the tax
characterization of entities, which include (1) supremacy
of the tax characterization rules of the source state, (2)
supremacy of the tax characterization rules of the resi-
dence state and (3) supremacy of the tax characterization
rules of the home state. Each of these proposals is briefly
described, and hypotheticals are provided as regards both
hybrid and reverse hybrid entity structures. Additionally,
similar examples of coordination taken from domestic and
supranational laws – especially from EU tax law – are
provided in order to support the author’s assertions.
Section 4 is divided into two parts. The first part refers
to the implementation of these proposals. In particular, it
stresses that only a uniform and worldwide implementa-
tion of a coordination rule – granting supremacy to the
tax characterization in either the source state, the resi-
dence state or the home state – could ensure a true
success. Accordingly, it reinforces the idea that only one
of these proposals could be implemented worldwide in
order to ensure that complexity and transaction costs are
truly reduced under the proposed scenarios. The second
part turns the analysis to specific open questions as
regards the three proposals analysed here. This reinforces
the idea that none of the proposals pretend to be perfect
solutions, let alone unbeatable ones, but rather serve the
humble purpose of reorientating the debate on hybrid
entity mismatches to what really matters.
2 SCOPE AND HYPOTHESES
This article aims to provide three specific alternatives for
coordination in the tax characterization of entities, which
should serve as a straightforward and suitable alternative
to replace the current OECD linking rules. The alternative
proposals are presented in a neutral manner, i.e. without
necessarily disclosing the preferences of the author for one
or the other. Accordingly, these proposals are mutually
exclusive. Therefore, only one of them should uniformly
be implemented worldwide.6 In other words, they do not
seek to be presented as different available alternatives
from amongst which countries should follow the most
suitable option for them. That would only increase the
level of complexity and transaction costs to levels equal
to – or exceeding – those under the OECD linking rules.7
This article provides some specific alternatives only as
regards hybrid entity mismatches. Therefore, the analysis
excludes all cases involving hybrid financial instruments,
i.e. cases when two countries classify the same financial
instrument differently: as debt in one jurisdiction and as
equity in the other.8 Likewise, this article does not
include cases of hybrid permanent establishment (PE)
mismatches, i.e. when two jurisdictions disagree as to
whether a business activity is being carried out through
a PE or not, nor does it refer to the implications of the
proposed rules within tax treaties. The analysis of the
proposals themselves is carried out using hypotheticals
that include both hybrid entities and reverse hybrid enti-
ties, both receiving and making deductible payments. A
particular focus is on cases where a deduction/non-inclu-
sion comes into play. However, other situations are also
contemplated. Yet, consideration of some issues consid-
ered under OECD BEPS Action 2, such as double deduc-
tion outcomes or dual resident mismatches, is beyond the
scope of this article.
Finally, unless indicated otherwise, all the hypotheti-
cals presented in this article assume that no withholding
tax is applied at source and that the domestic tests of
domestic general anti-avoidance rules (GAARs) have been
successfully passed.
The elaboration of the alternatives and their subsequent
analysis is based on the following three hypotheses:
(1) The consequentialist approach adopted by the OECD as
regards hybrid entity mismatches has resulted in a
complex set of rules – OECD linking rules – the
efficacy of which is rather questionable.9 For this rea-
son, double non-taxation – or deduction/non-inclusion
Notes
Intl. 1195 (2013); Y. Brauner, An International Tax Regime in Crystallization, 56 Tax L. Rev. 259 (2003); Y. Brauner, Integration in an Integrated World, 2(1) N.Y.U. J. L. &
Bus. 51 (2005); L. Dell’Anese, Tax Arbitrage and the Changing Structure of International Tax Law (Egea 2006). More recently, see R. Avi-Yonah, Who Invented the Single Tax
Principle?: An Essay on the History of U.S. Treaty Policy, 59 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 305, 309 (2014–2015); R. Avi-Yonah, The International Tax Regime: A Centennial
Reconsideration, U. of Mich. Public Law Research Paper No. 462 (2015). In contrast, e.g. H. D. Rosenbloom, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture: International Tax Arbitrage and
the ‘International Tax System’, 53 Tax L. Rev. 137 (2000); H. D. Rosenbloom, Cross-Border Arbitrage: The Good, The Bad and the Ugly, 85 Taxes (2007); J. Roin, Competition and
Evasion: Another Perspective on International Tax Competition, 89 Geo. L. J. 543 (2000); M. Kane, Strategy and Cooperation in National Responses to International Tax Arbitrage, 53(1)
Emory L. J. 89 (2004); M. J. Graetz, Taxing International Income: Inadequate Principles, Outdated Concepts and Unsatisfactory Policies, 26(4) Brook. J. Int’l L. 1357 (2001); D.
Shaviro, The Two Faces of the Single Tax Principle, N.Y.U. Law and Economics Working Papers, Paper No. 419, 1 (2015).
6 For a full analysis, see s. 4.
7 The complex construction and high transaction costs associated with the OECD linking rules have been largely discussed by this author. Parada, supra n. 1.
8 For a complete study of this specific topic, see e.g. J. Bundgaard, Hybrid Financial Instruments in International Tax Law (Wolters Kluwer 2017).
9 This author has already provided arguments elsewhere in this regard. Parada, supra n. 1.
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outcomes – should be completely disregarded in the
design of hybrid entity mismatch rules.10
(2) As the reason for the existence of hybrids and reverse
hybrid entities is indeed the different tax character-
ization of entities, attention should be turned back
to this fundamental element rather than sticking to
the outcomes of the specific transaction. In this
sense, rules aligning the tax characterization of enti-
ties (or coordination rules) appear to be more appro-
priate to achieve this aim.
(3) Even though single taxation is not the core of the
proposed alternatives in this article, they prove to be
very effective in achieving such a result. Therefore,
those in favour of a more consequentialist approach
as regards hybrid entity mismatches should also see
these alternatives as desirable.
3 ANALYSIS: THREE ALTERNATIVES FOR
COORDINATION
This section explores three possible scenarios for the coor-
dination of the tax characterization of entities as a suitable
alternative to replace the current OECD linking rules and
perhaps also, the consequentialist approach adopted by the
OECD on this matter. The analysis of these alternatives
aims to demonstrate that coordination appears to be not
only a more preferable path when compared to the OECD
approach of matching tax outcomes, but also a more
coherent and less costly solution for both taxpayers and
tax administrations.
This section analyses three specific scenarios for coordi-
nation, namely (1) supremacy of the tax characterization
rules of the source state, (2) supremacy of the tax char-
acterization rules of the residence state and (3) supremacy
of the tax characterization rules of the home state.
3.1 Supremacy of the Tax Characterization
Rules of the Source State
3.1.1 The Proposal
The first alternative is to coordinate the tax character-
ization of the entity the tax characterization of which is
relevant (i.e. when a relevant payment exists) based on
that given to it in the source state, i.e. the state of the
entity making the relevant payments. In other words, if
two or more jurisdictions differ as regards the tax
characterization of the same entity giving rise to hybrid
or reverse hybrid entities and a relevant payment exists,
the residence state of the investors (and the residence
state of the relevant entity, as well) must follow the tax
characterization given to the entity in the state from
which the relevant payments are made, i.e. the source
state.
This rule could be introduced as a domestic rule
using the following wording: ‘Where according to the
rules of a State, a different tax characterization is given
to the same entity, the tax characterization given to
that entity by the State where the relevant payment
has its source, shall be followed by the other(s) State
(s)’. The implications of such a coordination rule at
source will depend on whether one refers to cases invol-
ving hybrid or reverse hybrid entities and on whether
one refers to relevant payments made from or received
by these entities. All of these situations are analysed
below.
3.1.2 Illustrations
3.1.2.1 Cases Involving Hybrid Entities
A rule granting supremacy to the tax characterization
rules in the source state might work very well in a context
where a hybrid entity makes a deductible payment to a
related entity in another state where that payment is
disregarded due to the tax transparency of the payer
entity.
Assume that ACo, a taxable entity incorporated in State
A, grants a loan to BSub, an entity organized in State B.
BSub pays interest in the amount of 100 connected to that
loan.11 Also assume that State B does not apply a with-
holding tax at source. Accordingly, while State A regards
BSub as tax transparent, State B regards the same entity as
a taxable or opaque entity. In other words, BSub will be
considered a hybrid entity making a deductible payment
of interest, which – due to the tax transparency of BSub in
State A – will not be recognized as ordinary income in
State A either.
Notes
10 Double non-taxation is an ambiguous concept the proper understanding of which is generally underestimated. For an analysis of the different attempts to explain this
concept, see Parada, supra n. 3, at 13–22. According to this author: ‘The boundaries of the notion of DNT should remain within its nature of a simple outcome, absent of
subjective interpretations, not being thus regarded per se a cause of concern’. Parada, supra n. 3, at 50–51. Similarly, Marchgraber explains: ‘[ … ]not all situations where
something remains untaxed are necessarily problematic[ … ] But even with regard to those scenarios of alleged double non-taxation that are considered to be problematic
from a tax policy perspective, referring to the phenomenon of double non-taxation is not in itself sufficient to prove that there is a legal problem [ … ] Hence, the term
double non-taxation seems to be legally inexistent’. Marchgraber, supra n. 3, at 13.
11 The example also assumes that the loan is made at arm’s length and that resulting interest is calculated and charged accordingly.
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Figure 1 Coordination in the Source State and Deductible
Payments from Hybrid Entities
ACo 
State A 
State B 
State A and State B will consider BSub as a taxable 
entity. Thus, there will be no mismatch either as 
regards the tax characterization of the entity or as 
regards the interest payment.  
BSub 
Interest 
100 
Loan 
In this case, a rule granting supremacy to the tax
characterization of BSub in State B (the source state)
will mean that State A will follow the tax characteriza-
tion of BSub in State B. In other words, BSub will also
be regarded as a taxable entity in State A. Therefore, a
mismatch will no longer arise as regards the tax char-
acterization of BSub. Accordingly, there will be no
disparity as regards the payment either, because BSub
will be recognized as a taxable entity in the two states
involved in the transaction (State A and State B). That
is, even though the payments of interest in this
hypothetical will still be deductible in State B, they
will be recognized as ordinary income in State A. This
result should therefore also satisfy those in favour of a
more consequentialist approach to hybrid entity
mismatches.12
Similarly, a coordinated solution granting supremacy
to the tax characterization rules in the source state
appears to be very effective in cases where a hybrid entity
is receiving a deductible payment from either a third
(source) state or a taxpayer located in a state different
from the payee entity and which controls it. Scenario 1
(i.e. a deductible payment made from a party in a third
country) can be illustrated using the same example of
Figure 1, with the only difference that BSub receives
interest payments.
Figure 2 Coordination in the Source State and Deductible
Payments Made to Hybrid Entities (Scenario 1)
ACo 
State A 
State B 
State A and State B will consider BSub as a taxable 
entity. However, none of these two States is the source 
state. 
BSub 
Interest 
100 
If BSub is characterized for tax purposes according to
the tax characterization given in the source state, it is
evident that the source state will be neither State B nor
State A, but rather a third state from which the relevant
payment is made. The tax treatment of BSub will there-
fore depend exclusively on this third state. Thus, if, on
the one hand, the third state treats BSub as a tax
transparent entity, the interest payments will be recog-
nized as ordinary income in State A.13 If, on the other
hand, the third state treats BSub as a taxable entity,
interest will be allocated to BSub in State B. In this
latter case, however, nothing prevents State A from
applying its controlled foreign company (CFC) legisla-
tion, which could give rise to a potential case of double
taxation. This outcome, although undesirable, is per-
fectly avoidable in practice.14
Still, the author recognizes that relying exclusively
on the tax characterization given in a third (source)
state might give rise to abusive practices, as a third
state might be chosen just for purposes of arriving at an
expected result in a transaction involving two other
states where a hybrid entity receives a payment.15
Notes
12 For an analysis of the OECD consequentialist approach, see Parada, supra n. 1.
13 This should also satisfy the expectations of those arguing for matching tax outcomes, because the deductible payments will be recognized as income somewhere, even though
effective taxation does not ultimately exist. Indeed, effective single taxation will depend on the total amount of income and expenses at the level of ACo in State A in this
case.
14 E.g. in the United States, s. 960 of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) provides for a foreign tax credit with respect to the taxes paid at the level of the foreign-controlled
entity. If corporations claim the credit, the applicable provision is IRC Sec. 902. Likewise, the deemed foreign tax credit under s. 960 is available for taxes paid by
subsidiaries through the sixth tier. See US: IRC ss 960 & 902.
15 E.g. tax transparency in the source state might help BSub to avoid taxation in State B, knowing also that no taxation (or minimal taxation) will occur in State A. This is not
a priori an abusive practice, but it could be questionable if the transaction was crafted based exclusively on arriving at this tax outcome, especially considering the application
of GAARs.
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Considering the above, countries could still have the
chance not to apply the proposed coordination rule to
these specific situations. The forgoing should not vary
the position of those supporting the OECD approach to
hybrid entity mismatches, because indeed these cases of
hybrid entities receiving payments were not originally
considered in the scope of the OECD linking rules
either.16
Scenario 2, i.e. a deductible payment received from a
company controlling the hybrid entity and which is
located in a different state, can be illustrated using
the same example as that used in Figure 1, with the
only difference than ACo makes a deductible payment
to BSub.
Figure 3 Coordination in the Source State and Deductible
Payments Made to Hybrid Entities (Scenario 2)
ACo 
State A 
State B 
Non-deduction 
Non-Inclusion 
BSub 
Interest 
100 
In this case a coordinated solution that grants supre-
macy to the tax characterization rules in the source state
will mean that BSub is regarded as a tax transparent
entity in State A and State B. This is due to the tax
treatment in the source state (State A), where BSub is
seen as fiscally transparent. Therefore, the loan transac-
tion (including the interest payments) will be disre-
garded for tax purposes in both State A and State B,
which will give rise to a non-deduction/non-inclusion
outcome. This outcome could raise the alarm amongst
some in the international tax community. However, the
use of double non-taxation as the core element to design
anti-hybrid entity rules is very questionable and it is
certainly out of the concern of the proposed coordina-
tion rule.17 Furthermore, in the author’s opinion, in
these cases where double non-taxation arises in the
form of a ‘non-deduction/non-inclusion’, it should be
simply disregarded or assumed as a sunk cost of the
elimination the true hybrid entity mismatch, i.e. the
different tax characterization of the same entity by two
jurisdictions.18 Yet, if countries still conclude that non-
taxation will jeopardize their interests, they might have
the option to make the rule not applicable to these
specific cases.19
3.1.2.2 Cases Involving Reverse Hybrid Entities
A coordinated solution granting supremacy to the tax
characterization rules in the source state will also have a
positive impact in cases involving payments made to a
reverse hybrid entity.
In the example below, BSub is a reverse hybrid
entity, i.e. under the tax law of State B, BSub is
regarded as a transparent entity while State A and
State C regards BSub as a taxable or opaque entity.
Accordingly, assume that BSub receives interest from
CSub1, a sub-subsidiary that is established in State C.
If a coordinated solution granting supremacy to the
tax characterization rules in the source state is applied,
State B (payee state) and State A (investors state) will
follow the tax characterization of BSub given in State
C, i.e. where the relevant payment has its source.20 In
this case, State C treats BSub as a taxable entity. Thus,
the three states involved in this hypothetical will
regard BSub as a taxable entity. In other words, a
coordinated solution granting supremacy to the tax
characterization rules in the source state will comple-
tely eliminate the hybrid entity mismatch.21 Yet,
potential double taxation issues might still arise, par-
ticularly if State A decides to apply its CFC rules.
This outcome is nonetheless avoidable if domestic
relief is granted, which appears to be a generalized
practice.22
Notes
16 OECD, Action 2: 2015 Final Report, supra n. 2, at 49.
17 See s. 2.
18 Indeed, if countries were truly concerned about the non-taxation outcome, they could simply opt not to make the coordination rule applicable to cases involving a payment
made to a hybrid entity. Yet, the tax outcome should not be the starting point of the discussion, but rather the elimination of the disparity in the tax characterization of the
same entity. See also the hypotheses of this article at s. 2. For a more developed argument as regards the relationship between double non-taxation and hybrid entity rules, see
Parada, supra n. 3.
19 These situations of hybrid entities receiving a payment were also not included in the OECD BEPS Action 2 Final Report, as they did not generate a deduction/non-inclusion
outcome. OECD, Action 2: 2015 Final Report, supra n. 2, at 49.
20 The determination of source might nonetheless be troublesome. For a further analysis, see s. 4.2.1.
21 Even if State A were to change its tax characterization of BSub as a fiscally transparent entity, the solution should be satisfactory from a single taxation perspective, because
the interest payments would be recognized as ordinary income in State A anyway. Nonetheless, see also the concerns raised by this author with respect to achieving ‘effective
single taxation’ at supra n. 13.
22 Supra n. 14.
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Accordingly, if BSub is now regarded as a tax transpar-
ent entity in State C (the source state), the outcome of
granting supremacy to the tax characterization rules in the
source state is still desirable. First, the hybrid entity
mismatch disappears, as States A, B and C will regard
BSub as a tax transparent entity. Second, there will be no
need to rely on CFC rules in order to ensure that the
interest payments are recognized as ordinary income
somewhere, because ACo will recognize those interest
payments as income in State A due to the tax transparency
treatment of BSub. This outcome should therefore also
satisfy those who argue for ensuring single taxation in
cases involving hybrids.
Nevertheless, the downside of granting supremacy to the
tax characterization rules in the source state in this case is
that the source state will never coincide with the state in
which the entity is formally or legally established. That is
to say, a provision granting supremacy to the tax character-
ization rules in the source state will always mean that the
tax characterization of BSub in a third country (State C)
prevails, which could raise questions as regards both legal
certainty and excessive reliance on foreign law.23
From a different perspective, a rule granting supremacy
to the tax characterization rules in the source state might
be more questionable in the case of deductible payments
made from a reverse hybrid to a third state different from
Figure 4 Coordination in the Source State and Deductible Payments Received by a Reverse Hybrid Entity
ACo 
State A 
State B 
BSub 
Interest 
Loan 
CSub 1 
State C 
If coordination in the source state applies, BSsub will be regarded as a  taxable entity in 
State A, State B and State C. The hybrid entity mismatch is solved, although potential 
double taxation issues might arise if State A applies its CFC legislation.  
Figure 5 Coordination in the Source State and Deductible Payments Received by a Reverse Hybrid (Option 2)
ACo 
State A 
State B 
Interest 
Loan 
CSub 1 
State C 
If coordination in the source states applies, BSsub will be regarded as a tax transparent 
entity in States A, B and C. The hybrid entity mismatch is solved. Accordingly, there will 
be no need to rely on CFC legislation in order to ensure that the interest payments are 
included as ordinary income in State A. 
BSub 
Notes
23 For further analysis, see s. 4.2.1.
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the state of the investors controlling the reverse hybrid
entity. This can be illustrated using the facts in Figure 4,
with the sole difference that a payment of interest is made
from BSub to CSub1 (see below).
Based on the facts of this hypothetical, BSub will be
regarded as a tax transparent entity in State A (investors
state), State B (the source state) and State C (the payee
state). The outcome of this transaction (‘deduction/non-
inclusion’) might nonetheless generate some concern
amongst some in the international tax community.
However, in the author’s opinion, this concern would
not be unjustified, as design of the coordination rule
does not pay attention to the occurrence (or not) of double
non-taxation.24 In spite of the foregoing, nothing would
prevent countries from opting not to apply the proposed
coordination rule in those specific cases where a reverse
hybrid is making a payment to a third country. After all,
those cases were originally excluded from OECD BEPS
Action 2 because they did not generate a double non-
taxation concern.25 In other words, if some countries still
conclude that non-taxation jeopardizes their domestic
position, the option to step out could be available.
Finally, in cases of reverse hybrid entities making
deductible payments to the state where the investors
controlling the entity are located, the outcome of grant-
ing supremacy to the tax characterization rules in the
source state might also be questionable, especially for
those arguing for single taxation. Take the facts of
Figure 4, with the only difference that BSub pays inter-
est to ACo.
Figure 6 Coordination in the Source State and Deductible Payments Made by a Reverse Hybrid Entity to a Third State
ACo 
 State A 
(BSub is still a taxable entity) 
 State B 
(BSub is tax transparent) 
Interest 
CSub 1 
State C 
(BSub is tax transparent) 
BSub 
Non-Deduction Non-recognition 
of income 
Figure 7 Coordination in the Source State and Deductible Payments Made by a Reverse Hybrid to Its Controlling Investor
ACo 
State A 
State B 
BSub 
Interest 
Loan 
CSub 1 
State C 
State A and State B will consider BSub as a fiscally transparent entity. The tax treatment in 
State C in this case is irrelevant, because the payment is sourced in State B and the 
investors are in State A.  
Notes
24 See the hypotheses of this article in s. 2.
25 OECD, Action 2: 2015 Final Report, supra n. 2, at 59–60.
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If a rule granting supremacy to the tax characterization
in the source state is applied, States A and B will regard
BSub as a fiscally transparent entity, which is the tax
treatment given in State B (the source state). Therefore,
the interest payments will not be deductible in State B
and they will also not be recognized as income in State A,
because the whole transaction is disregarded for tax pur-
poses in that state.
As to the tax treatment in State C, this is partially
irrelevant, as the payment is sourced in State B and the
investors are located in State A. However, if State C treats
BSub as a tax transparent entity, an interest deduction in
State C can be generated by the sole application of the
proposed coordination rule. This deduction will not be
followed by a corresponding recognition of income in
State A due to the tax transparency of BSub in State A
and State B, as well. Although this deduction/non-inclu-
sion outcome could again be viewed with scepticism by a
significant portion of the international tax community, it
is important to highlight again that the use of double
non-taxation as the core element when designing anti-
hybrid rules is highly questionable.26 Nonetheless, this
should not prevent countries from opting not to apply the
proposed coordination rule to these specific cases where a
reverse hybrid entity is making a payment to its
investors.27
3.1.3 Practical Examples in Support of this Proposal
Some examples of supremacy given to the tax characteriza-
tion rules in the source state can be found either in the text
of the law or as a result of the interpretation of the law or
administrative practice. The cases of Article 10 of the
Proposal for the EU Anti Tax Avoidance Directive
(ATAD) and the Spanish tax characterization rules are briefly
referred to below as two examples of this. This section does
not provide an in-depth analysis of these specific measures,
but rather offers a practical approach to the hypothetical
analysis already carried out in section 3.1.2.
3.1.3.1 Article 10(1) of the Proposal for the EU
Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive
In 2016 the European Commission issued a proposal for a
Council Directive, the purpose of which was to lay down
rules against tax avoidance practices that might affect the
internal market.28 In this regard, the following specific
rule on hybrid mismatch arrangements was introduced:
‘Where two Member States give a different legal char-
acterization to the same taxpayer (hybrid entity),
including its permanent establishments in one or
more Member States, and this leads to either a situation
where a deduction of the same payment, expenses or
losses occurs both in the Member State in which the
payment has its source, the expenses are incurred or the
losses are suffered and in another Member State or a
situation where there is a deduction of a payment in the
Member State in which the payment has its source
without a corresponding inclusion of the same payment
in the other Member State, the legal characterization given
to the hybrid entity by the Member State in which the payment
has its source, the expenses are incurred or the losses are
suffered shall be followed by the other Member State’ (empha-
sis added).29
As to hybrid entity mismatches, this rule means that if a
legal entity organized in an EU Member State, which is
treated as a taxable entity there, pays deductible interest
to its parent company located in another EU Member
State, where the same entity (payer) is regarded as fiscally
transparent, the EU Member State of the recipient entity
must follow the tax characterization given to the payer
entity in the Member State where the interest payments
were sourced. In other words, Article 10 of the Proposal
for the EU ATAD not only helps to avoid double non-
taxation (which is arguably the true reason for hybrid
entity mismatches), but also directly solves the disparity
in the tax characterization of the relevant entity, which
appears to be the core of the issue at stake. The outcome
would therefore be exactly as demonstrated in Figure 1
Notes
26 See hypotheses in s. 2. and references at supra n. 10. See also Parada, supra n. 1.
27 As already emphasized in this article, these situations in which a reverse hybrid entity makes a deductible payment to its controlling company were not considered as a
concern in the OECD BEPS Action 2 Final Report, either, because the outcome (deduction/non-inclusion) was not present. OECD, Action 2: 2015 Final Report, supra n. 2, at
59–60.
28 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive lying down rules against tax avoidance practices that directly affect the functioning of the internal market, COM (2016) 26 final
(28 Jan. 2016). This proposal was part of a full Anti-Tax Avoidance Package that included other initiatives, e.g. a recommendation on tax treaties; a revision of the
Administrative Cooperation Directive; a Communication on an External Strategy for Effective Taxation and a Chapeau Communication and Staff Working Document. See
Council of the European Union, Report of the Code of Conduct Group (Business Taxation), 16553/1/1/14 Rev. 1, FISC 225, ECOFIN 1166, (11 Dec. 2014). See also European
Commission, Commission Communication, A Fair and Efficient Corporate Tax System in the European Union: 5 Key Areas for Action, COM (2015) 302 final, (17 June 2015). The
solution of the original proposal for EU ATAD was also in line with the recommendation of the European Parliament of Dec. 2015, where it called for a proposal ‘to either
harmonize national definitions of debt, equity, opaque and transparent entities [ … ]; or prevent double non-taxation, in the event of a mismatch’. European Commission,
Recommendation C6 ‘Hybrid Mismatches’ of the Resolution of the European Parliament with recommendations to the Commission on bringing transparency, coordination
and convergence to corporate tax policies in the Union, 2015/2010 (INL), (16 Dec. 2015). For an early analysis of the different measures included in the EU proposal, see A.
Navarro, L. Parada & P. Schwarz, The Proposal for an EU Anti-Avoidance Directive: Some Preliminary Thoughts, 25 EC Tax Rev. 3 (2016). See also S. Krauß, EU-BEPS?
Aktionsplan für eine faire und effiziente Unternehmensbesteuerung in der EU, Internationales Steuerrecht 2, 45 et seq (2016). For an EU proposal of harmonization as regards the tax
characterization of entities rules under the principle of mutual recognition of entities in EU Law, see Fibbe, supra n. 4, at 293–384.
29 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive, supra n. 28, Art. 10(1).
Hybrid Entity Mismatches: Exploring Three Alternatives for Coordination
31
above.30 Accordingly, granting supremacy to the tax char-
acterization rules in the source Member State directly
avoids implementing more invasive measures, such as
obligating a Member State to deny a deduction when a
correspondent inclusion of income is not made in the
other Member State, or to force a Member State to recog-
nize a deductible payment as ordinary income, even
though such a payment is originally disregarded because
of the tax treatment of the entity making the payment.31
This approach ultimately prevents complexities and con-
sequentialist approaches that might ultimately affect
legitimate transactions.32 Needless to say, such an
approach makes total sense in a regional coordinated con-
text such as the European Union.33
Beyond the similarities with the proposed coordination
rule, Article 10 of the Proposal for the EU ATAD still has
deviations that mostly relate to the context and scope of
this latter rule. For example Article 10 of the Proposal for
the EU ATAD was designed to apply exclusively within
the EU context. That is, all the cases of hybrid entity
mismatches with third countries fell outside the scope of
the rule. This raised significant questions, especially as
regards cases involving US owners holding ownership in
EU hybrid entities, particularly because of the use of the
check-the-box regulations in the United States.34 Indeed, it
is evident that the elective nature of US tax law in deter-
mining the tax characterization of a foreign entity places
US investors holding ownership in EU entities in a rela-
tively privileged position vis-à-vis EU or even third country
investors.35 This issue was nonetheless partially resolved
with the extension of the hybrid rules to cases involving
hybrid entity mismatches outside the EU according to the
amendments in the EU ATAD 2. However, there are still
doubts with respect to certain transactions included within
the scope of the EU ATAD 2.36 Likewise, one should also
consider that Article 10 of the Proposal for the EU ATAD
did not completely depart from the OECD consequentialist
approach. That is, the rule applied only to the extent that a
disparate tax characterization as regards the same entity
existed and that disparity resulted in a deduction/non-
inclusion outcome.37 This idea is nonetheless overcome in
this article. Indeed, no attention is paid to the outcome of
the hybrid transaction, but rather – and exclusively – to the
disparate tax characterization of the same entity.38
3.1.3.2 The Spanish Coordination
Practice: Deductible Payments
from Hybrid Entities
The Spanish administrative tax practice as regards the tax
characterization of foreign entities is another example that
supports the notion of granting supremacy to the tax
characterization in the source state. However, this is true
only in the cases where a foreign hybrid entity makes
deductible payments to the Spanish investors controlling
the relevant entity.39 In all other cases involving hybrid
entity mismatches, e.g. when Spanish investors control-
ling the foreign hybrid entity makes deductible payments
to it or when a foreign hybrid entity or a reverse foreign
hybrid receive deductible payments from a party in a third
country in a triangular case, the Spanish interpretation
Notes
30 The author provides elsewhere a simple example where a company (X) organized in Member State 1 has a subsidiary (Y) in Member State 2. For Member State 1’s tax
purposes, Y is tax transparent, while for Member State 2’s tax purposes, the same entity is regarded as a taxable entity. It is also assumed that X grants a loan to Y and Y
pays interest thereon. As noted there, Art. 10 of the Proposal for the EU ATAD means that Y (payer) will deduct the interest in Member State 2, but this payment will be
recognized as ordinary income in Member State 1. Thus, both the hybrid entity mismatch and the disparity as regards the payment (deduction/non-inclusion outcome)
disappear. Parada, supra n. 3, at 174, Figure 20.
31 These were unfortunately the final rules (OECD linking rules) introduced in the EU ATAD 1. See EU Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive (ATAD 1): Council Directive (EU)
2016/1164 of 12 July 2016 laying down rules against tax avoidance practices that directly affect the functioning of the internal market, OJ L193/1 (19 July 2016), Art. 9.
For a general analysis of the rules, see G. K. Fibbe, Hybrid Mismatch Rules under ATAD I & II, in The Implementation of Anti-BEPS Rules in the EU: A Comprehensive Study (P.
Pistone & D. Weber eds, IBFD 2018). See also O. Popa, Recent Measures to Counter Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements at the EU Level, 57 Eur. Tax’n. 9 (2017).
32 For a critical view of the OECD consequentialist approach, see Parada, supra n. 1.
33 Navarro, Parada & Schwarz, supra n. 28, at 129.
34 Generally speaking, the US check-the-box regulations provide that an ‘eligible (foreign) entity’ (i.e. an entity not listed as a per se corporation in Treas. Reg. Sec. 301.7701–
2(b)(8)) may elect to be classified either as an association, which is taxable as a corporation in the United States, or as a partnership, which is taxable only at the level of the
partners. US: Treas. Reg. Sec. 301.7701–3(a). If an eligible foreign entity has only one member, it may choose to be classified either as an association or as a disregarded
entity. The election may be made at any time and it must comply with the formal requirements established by law (‘entity classification election’) jointly with its federal tax
or information return of the taxable year in which the election is made. If the entity is not required to file a return for that year, i.e. attaching a copy of Form 8832 to the
federal tax or information return of any direct or indirect owner of the entity for the taxable year in which the election is made. US: Treas. Reg. Sec. 301.7701–3(c)(1)(ii). For
a further analysis of the check-the-box rules, see e.g. D. M. Benson et al., ‘Hybrid’ Entities: Practical Application Under the Check-the-Box Regime, 26(8) Tax Mgmt. Int’l J. 363
(1997); B. N. Davis, U.S. Tax Treatment of ‘Reverse Hybrid’ Foreign Entities, 24(12) Tax Mgmt. Int’l J. 593–596 (1995); M. Gianni, International Tax Planning After Check-the-
Box, 2 J. Passthrough Entities 9 (1999); P. Hobbs, Entity Classification: The One Hundred-Year Debate, 44(2) Cath. U. L. Rev. 437 (1995); H. Mogenson et al., Hybrid Entities:
Practical Application under the Check-the-Box Regime, 23(1) Int’l Tax J. 4 (1997). For an analysis, see also Parada, supra n. 3, at 129–157.
35 Navarro, Parada & Schwarz, supra n. 28, at 129.
36 E.g. payments made to a reverse hybrid entity in cases where the reverse hybrid entity is not organized in the EU. The wording of Art. 9a suggests that those cases would not
be within the scope of the Directive. However, some authors disagree with this statement. See e.g. G. K. Fibbe & A. J. A. Stevens, Hybrid Mismatches Under the ATAD I and
ATAD II, 26(3) EC Tax Rev. 153, 165 (2017).
37 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directivesupra n. 28, Art. 10(1).
38 This idea is also emphasized in Parada, supra n. 1.
39 In these cases, it is evident that the source state and the state of the hybrid entity’s establishment (the home state) will coincide. Therefore, it appears to be irrelevant to
distinguish between a coordination rule according to the source state rules or according to the home state rules.
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comes closer to a coordination rule granting supremacy to
the rules in the home state of the relevant entity.40
The Spanish tax characterization system is based on
the distinction between business and civil law entities
for tax purposes, because while business entities are
subject to Spanish corporate income tax, civil law
entities are subject to a special regime, namely the
income attribution regime.41 Under this regime, enti-
ties are considered taxpayers. The income and the
relevant taxes are therefore attributed to the partners
of these entities who will bear the final tax burden.42
The income attribution regime can also be applied to
foreign entities the juridical nature of which is con-
sidered similar or identical to Spanish entities subject
to the regime. Indeed, under Article 37 of the Non-
Resident Income Tax Law (NRITL): ‘Those entities
incorporated abroad and the juridical nature of which
is identical or analogous to those of entities subject to
the income attribution regime, which are incorporated
under Spanish Law, shall also be considered as entities
subject to the attribution of income regime’.43 As
such, the Spanish law gives the impression – at least
at first glance – of a simple resemblance test rather
than a more elaborate coordination system as regards
the tax characterization of foreign entities.44
Nevertheless, a closer look at the interpretation of
this provision by the Spanish tax administration (the
Directorate-General for Taxation (DGT), Ministerio de
Hacienda) leads one to a different conclusion. Indeed,
there are plenty of examples of DGT responses to
taxpayer consultations where the DGT has accepted
that when the test of Article 37 of the NRITL is
applied, the tax treatment of the entity given in the
foreign country is the central element to consider in
determining the tax characterization of the foreign
entity in Spain.45 In other words, when the Spanish
test is applied in practice, it comes closer to a coordi-
nation rule than a resemblance test. This opinion is
also widely supported in Spanish tax literature.46
Therefore, following the aforementioned interpreta-
tion of the income attribution regime (administrative
practice of the DGT), there will be no possibilities for
hybrid entity mismatches to arise in all cases where
Spanish investors hold a participation in a foreign entity
the tax characterization of which differs from that in
Spain. For example if a foreign hybrid entity makes a
payment to a Spanish entity controlling the foreign
hybrid, such as in the example in Figure 1, the result
will be that the foreign hybrid entity will be treated as a
taxable entity in both Spain and the foreign state.
Therefore, the interest deduction will be allowed in the
foreign payer state, but a recognition of those payments
as ordinary income will take place in Spain (payee state).
This result should thus also satisfy those arguing for the
taxation of income somewhere as a desirable tax policy
result of transactions involving hybrid entities, even
though such a result will still depend of the effective
amount of income and expenses at the level of the
recipient entity. Yet, it is evident that hybrid entity
mismatches will still arise in the opposite situation, i.e.
in all cases where a Spanish entity is characterized dif-
ferently in a foreign state.47
Moreover, one could regard the Spanish administrative
practice as fragile, i.e. there is no assurance that it will not
change over time. Therefore, a statutory rule such as that
proposed in section 3.1.1, which recognizes in part the
long-standing tax administration practice in Spain, still
appears to be a more desirable approach.48
Notes
40 For further analysis, see s. 3.3.3.2.
41 ES: Personal Income Tax Law, Law 35/2006 of 28 Nov. 2006 (Ley de Impuesto a la Renta sobre las Personas Físicas (LIRPF)), Art. 8.3.
42 Ibid.
43 ES: Non-Resident Income Tax Law (Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta de no Residentes), Royal Legislative Decree 5/2004 of 5 Mar. 2004, Art. 37 (author’s translation).
44 The majority of countries opt for a comparative approach or ‘resemblance test’ to characterize foreign entities for tax purposes. Following this path, a foreign entity is
regarded as a taxable or transparent entity depending on the level of comparability or equivalence to domestic taxable entities. Germany and the Netherlands are examples of
countries applying this approach. For an explanation of the German resemblance test, see e.g. C. Kahlenberg, Classification of Foreign Entities for German Tax Purposes 54 Eur.
Tax’n. 4 (2014). See also U. Henkel, Subjektfähigkeit grenzüberschreitender Kapitalgesellschaften, Recht der internationalen Wirtschaft (RIW) 7 (1991). For a general explanation
of the Dutch resemblance test, see M. De Graaf & J. Gooijer, Netherlands in Qualification of Taxable Entities and Tax Treaty Protection, IFA Cahiers, Vol. 99B, 563 (IFA 2014).
Before the implementation of the check-the-box regulations in 1996, the United States also characterized foreign entities for tax purposes based on a resemblance test
(known as the ‘Kintner test’) that considered the concurrence of four corporate features, namely limited liability; continuity of life; centralized management, and free
transferability of interests. See US: 14 Oct. 1954, US v. Kintner, 216 F2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954). For references as regards the US check-the-box regulations, see supra n. 34.
45 E.g. ES: DGT, Consulta Vinculante V1398-16 of 5 Apr. 2016; DGT, Consulta Vinculante V3319-16 of 17 July 2016; DGT, Consulta Vinculante V3836-15 of 2 Dec.
2015; DGT, Consulta Vinculante V1631-14 of 25 June 2014; DGT, Consulta Vinculante V0012-11 of 11 Jan. 2011; DGT, Consulta General 0024–07 of 1 July 2007;
DGT, Consulta General 0196–05 of 1 June 2005, among others. For a more detailed analysis of some specific decisions of the DGT, see Parada, supra n. 3, at 159–162.
46 See e.g. D. Jiménez-Valladolid de L’Hotellerie-Fallois & F. Vega Borrego, Spain, in Corporate Income Tax Subjects, EATLP International Tax Series, vol. 12, 460–464 (D.
Gutmann ed., 2016). See also A. Mosquera Mouriño, Régimen de atribución de rentas: especial referencia a las actividades económicas, (4) Carta Tributaria 3–16 (2012); Parada, supra
n. 3, at 157–162.
47 The afore-mentioned also reduces the complexity of the Spanish tax characterization test and increases the level of legal certainty for taxpayers involved in legitimate tax
planning structures using hybrid entities. Parada, supra n. 3, at 162. In contrast, see M. Villar, Spain in Qualification of Taxable Entities and Tax Treaty Protection, IFA Cahiers
Vol. 99B, 743 (IFA 2014).
48 Indeed, if one considers that the current interpretation of the Spanish resemblance test deviates completely from the textual wording of the law, a new statutory rule would
avoid any further conflicts. Parada, supra n. 3, at 162.
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3.2 Supremacy of the Tax Characterization
Rules of the Residence State
3.2.1 The Proposal
The second alternative for coordination in the tax character-
ization of entities would be to align the tax characterization
of the relevant entity based on the tax characterization given
in the residence state of the majority of the investors holding
ownership in the relevant entity, independently of the ori-
ginal tax treatment of the entity in its state of establishment.
In other words, this means giving supremacy to the tax
characterization of the entity in the state where the majority
of owners are considered tax residents.
As in the case of coordination granting supremacy to
the tax characterization rules in the source state, this
coordination rule could be introduced at a domestic level
using the following wording:
Where according to the rules of a State A, an entity is
considered to be a taxable entity or a fiscally transparent
entity, but more than 50% of its owners – directly or
indirectly by shares or voting rights – are tax residents in
State B where the entity is treated for tax purposes in the
other way around, the tax treatment of the entity in StateA
will follow the one given in State B, i.e. the country of the
owners holding more than 50% by shares or voting rights.
The implications of the rule will also depend on whether
the situation involves hybrid or reverse hybrid entities, as
well as whether the situation involves relevant payments
made from or received by these entities. All of these
implications are analysed below.
3.2.2 Illustrations
3.2.2.1 Cases Involving Hybrid Entities
Granting supremacy to the tax characterization rules in
the state where the majority of the owners are residents
may work very well in the context where a hybrid entity
makes deductible payments to a related entity in another
state where that payment is disregarded due to the tax
transparency of the payer entity.
Consider again the simple bilateral hypothetical where
ACo, a taxable entity incorporated in State A, grants a loan
to BSub, an entity organized in StateB.BSub pays interest in
the amount of 100 connected to that loan.49 Also assume
that State B does not apply a withholding tax at source.
Accordingly, while State A regards BSub as tax transparent,
State B regards the same entity as a taxable or opaque entity.
Figure 8 Coordination in the Residence State And Deductible
Payments Made by a Hybrid Entity
ACo 
State A 
State B 
State A and State B will consider BSub as a fiscally 
transparent entity. The coordination at residence will 
eliminate the mismatch.  
Interest 
100 
Loan 
BSub 
If a provision granting supremacy to the tax character-
ization rules in the state where the majority of owners are
tax residents is applied, State B will follow the tax char-
acterization of BSub in State A and will regard BSub as a
tax transparent entity, as well (see above). This implies
that no mismatch will arise as regards the tax character-
ization of BSub, because State A and State B will align
their tax treatment as regards BSub. Accordingly, the
transaction will result in a non-deduction/non-inclusion
of income, because a deduction will no longer be available
in State B where BSub is now treated as fiscally transpar-
ent. Likewise, no recognition of the interest as ordinary
income will occur in State A, where BSub is also regarded
as fiscally transparent, and therefore, the whole loan trans-
action is disregarded for tax purposes. This outcome
should not be considered problematic at all, because it
indeed produces the same result as applying a primary
response under the current OECD linking rules.50 Indeed,
a primary response will deny a deduction in State B to the
extent that the interest is not recognized as ordinary
income in State A.51 Yet, the difference is precisely that
a coordination rule granting supremacy to the tax char-
acterization rules in the state where the majority of owners
Notes
49 The example also assumes that the loan is made at arm’s length and that resulting interest is calculated and charged accordingly.
50 As to the primary response, the OECD BEPS Action 2 Final Report states: ‘In respect of such hybrid mismatch arrangements this report recommends that the response should
be to deny the deduction in the payer jurisdiction’. OECD, Action 2: 2015 Final Report, supra n. 2, at 17. Accordingly, the OECD provides: ‘[ … ] the disregarded hybrid
payments rule should only operate to the extent that the payer is entitled to a deduction for a payment under local law’. OECD, Action 2: 2015 Final Report, supra n. 2, at 51.
For a critical analysis of the OECD linking rules as regards hybrid entity mismatches, see Parada, supra n. 1. See also Parada, supra n. 3, at 299–343. Also for a critical analysis
of the OECD approach to hybrid entity mismatches and the implementation of linking rules, see Cooper, supra n. 1 and Lüdicke, supra n. 1.
51 See ibid.
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are residents requires less effort from the tax administra-
tion in applying it. Indeed, there is only one task for the
tax administration in State B in this case, namely to
determine the tax treatment of BSub in State A.52 This
is done without paying attention to whether or not pay-
ments where included as ordinary income in that state,
which is indeed a requirement to deny a deduction under
the OECD primary response.53
Similarly, the provision aims to apply to payments
received by a hybrid entity, generating also positive results.
Consider the example of Figure 8, with the only difference
that BSub receives interest payments from a party in a third
state. Regardless of what happens in the state fromwhich the
payment is sourced, the fact that BSub is regarded as a tax
transparent entity by its single majority owner in State A,
where this is a tax resident, will ensure that the interest
payments flow through BSub and are recognized as ordinary
income in State A. This outcome should thus also satisfy
those arguing for ensuring single taxation of transaction
involving hybrid entities. This also proves one of the main
hypotheses of this article, namely that even though a rule
granting supremacy to the tax characterization rules in the
state where the majority of owners are residents is not based
on the outcome of the transaction, it can be very effective in
achieving such a result.54
Figure 9 Coordination in the Residence State and Deductible
Payments Made to a Hybrid Entity (Scenario 1)
ACo 
State A 
State B 
State A and State B will consider BSub as a fiscally 
transparent entity. The coordination at residence will 
eliminate the mismatch and the interest payments will 
be recognized as income in State A. 
Interest 
100 
BSub 
A similar conclusion should be achieved if deductible
payments are made from ACo to BSub, as illustrated
below. Indeed, granting supremacy to the tax character-
ization rules in the state where the majority of owners are
residents would mean that State A and State B will regard
BSub as fiscally transparent. Therefore, the loan transac-
tion will be completely disregarded by the two states
involved, or similarly, the interest deduction will be no
longer available in State A and no income will be recog-
nized in State B.
Figure 10 Coordination in the Residence State and Deductible
Payments Made to a Hybrid Entity (Scenario 2)
ACo 
State A 
State B 
State A and State B will consider BSub as a fiscally 
transparent entity. The coordination at residence will 
eliminate the mismatch and the loan and interest 
payments will be disregarded in both State A and 
State B. 
Interest 
100 
BSub 
Non-deduction 
Non-inclusion 
The outcome in Figure 10 might nonetheless raise the
alarm amongst some in the international tax community.
However, as already emphasized in this article, the use of
double non-taxation as the core element in the design anti-
hybrid rules is questionable and should be disregarded.55
Yet, countries that still conclude that non-taxation will
jeopardize their interests, might have the option to make
the rule not applicable to these specific cases.56
3.2.2.2 Cases Involving Reverse Hybrid Entities
Granting supremacy to the tax characterization rules in
the state where the majority of the owners are residents
Notes
52 This certainly reduces the reliance on foreign law in comparison with the OECD linking rules. Parada, supra n. 3, at 314–316.
53 For a further analysis of the OECD linking rules and hybrid entities, see Parada, supra n. 3, at 279 et seq.
54 See s. 2.
55 See hypotheses of this article at s. 2.
56 An exception to the domestic provision granting supremacy to the tax characterization rules in the state where the majority of owners are residents in this case should not
alter the international status quo, as transactions involving payments made to a hybrid entity were not originally considered within the scope of BEPS Action 2 Final Report
either. OECD, Action 2: 2015 Final Report, supra n. 2, at 49, recommendation 3.2.
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will have a similar outcome as granting supremacy to
the tax characterization rules in the source state when
deductible payments come from a party in a third state
that regards a tax transparent entity as a taxable entity.-
57 This can be illustrated using again the example in
Figure 4, i.e. assume that BSub is a reverse hybrid
entity wholly owned by ACo, a company resident in
State A, that receives interest from CSbub1, a sub-
subsidiary established in a third State C.
If one considers a provision granting supremacy to the
tax characterization rules in the state where the majority
of owners are residents, State B will follow the tax char-
acterization of BSub based on that given in State A, i.e.
where the majority of the investors treat the entity as a
taxable entity. This solution will solve the hybrid entity
mismatch and will ensure that the interest payments are
recognized as ordinary income in State B.58 This result
should therefore also satisfy those arguing for ensuring
single taxation in transactions involving hybrid and
reverse hybrid entities. Yet, potential double taxation
issues might still arise, particularly if State A decides to
apply its CFC rules, as well. However, even in such a
situation domestic relief could be granted, which is indeed
a common worldwide practice.59
However, the outcome of granting supremacy to the tax
characterization rules in the residence state may be more
questionable where deductible payments are made from a
reverse hybrid to a third state. This can be illustrated
using the facts in Figure 11, with the sole difference
that a payment of interest is made from BSub to CSub1.
A provision granting supremacy to the tax character-
ization rules in the state where the majority of owners are
residents will imply that BSub will now be treated as a
taxable entity in State B. Thus, a potential deduction for
the interest payments will arise in State B. The outcome
in State C will depend on the tax treatment of BSub in
that state. If BSub is also regarded as a taxable entity in
State C, there will be recognition of the interest as ordin-
ary income in State C. However, if BSub is regarded as
fiscally transparent in State C, the final outcome will be a
deduction/non-inclusion, which could raise the alarm
amongst an important portion of international tax scho-
lars, even though for purposes of all the three proposals for
coordination in this article, it does not represent a concern
at all. Yet, this author recognizes that double non-taxa-
tion in this case arises exclusively due to the application of
the proposed coordination rule. Thus, countries could still
opt not to apply the provision. This exception could be
included in domestic law together with the main coordi-
nation provision.
Consider the following analysis of the impact of a
provision granting supremacy to the tax characterization
rules in the state where the majority of the owners are
residents in the case of reverse hybrid entities making
payments to the state where the owners controlling the
entity are located. Assume that BSub is a reverse hybrid
entity wholly owned by ACo, a company resident in State
A, which receives interest from BSub. Disregard the exis-
tence of a third State C, which is irrelevant for purposes of
this illustration.
Figure 11 Coordination in the Residence State and Payments Received by a Reverse Hybrid Entity
ACo 
State A 
State B 
BSub 
Interest 
Loan 
CSub 1 
State C 
Notes
57 See s. 3.1.2.2.
58 This solution is also interesting from the perspective of generating tax revenue, because the fact that the entity (BSub) is recharacterized for tax purposes from a tax
transparent entity to a taxable entity will ensure that tax revenue stays in the state of the entity (State B in the example). This is perhaps also the reason why this rule was
also introduced in Art. 9a of the EU ATAD 2. EU Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive (ATAD 2): Council Directive (EU) 2017/952 of 29 May 2017 amending Directive (EU)
2016/1164 as regards hybrid mismatches with third countries OJ L144/1 (7 July 2017). For a further analysis, see s. 3.2.3.3.
59 An example at supra n. 14.
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Figure 13 Coordination in the Residence State and Payments
Made by a Reverse Hybrid Entity to Its Controlling Investor
ACo 
State A 
State B 
BSub 
Interest 
Coordination in the residence state means that BSub is 
considered a taxable entity both in State A and State 
B. The outcome will thus be a deduction/inclusion of 
income. 
As noted, a provision granting supremacy to the tax
characterization rules in the state where the majority of
owners are residents means in this case that State A and
State B will regard BSub as a taxable entity. Therefore,
the interest will be deductible in State B while the
interest will be recognized as ordinary income in State
A. The same outcome will appear if BSub (a reverse
hybrid) receives deductible payments from the investors
(ACo), i.e. a deduction/inclusion will arise, as the coor-
dination rule provides for coordination based on the tax
treatment in State A where BSub is regarded as a
taxable entity.
Figure 14 Coordination in the Residence State and Payments
to a Reverse Hybrid Entity by Its Controlling Investor
ACo 
State A 
State B 
BSub 
Interest 
Thus, in both cases a provision granting supremacy to the
tax characterization rules in the state where the majority of
owners are residents should be seen positively. First, it solves
the hybrid entity mismatch in its origin, i.e. there will no
longer be a disparate tax characterization of BSub. Second, it
appears to give rise to an outcome that should equally satisfy
both sceptics and non-sceptics of single taxation as regards
transactions involving hybrid and reverse hybrid entities.
Indeed, the application of this proposal proves to be very
effective in achieving a single taxation result, even though
the proposal does not focus on achieving such an outcome.60
3.2.3 Practical Examples in Support of this Proposal
Some examples of provisions granting supremacy to
the tax characterization rules in the state where the
majority of owners are tax residents can be found in
Figure 12 Coordination in the Residence State and Payments Made by a Reverse Hybrid Entity to a Third Country
ACo 
State A 
State B 
BSub 
Interest 
CSub 1 
State C 
Notes
60 See s. 3.
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both existing law and recommendations for future
legislation. The discussion below considers the
Danish anti-hybrid rules, Recommendation 5.2 of the
BEPS Action 2 Final Report and Article 9a of the EU
ATAD 2. The ultimate aim of this section is not to
provide an in-depth analysis of these specific provi-
sions, but rather to offer a practical approach to the
hypothetical analysis already carried out in section
3.2.2.
3.2.3.1 Danish Anti-Hybrid Entity Rules
Danish tax law provides some specific rules designed to
counteract cases involving hybrids and reverse hybrid
entities, especially motivated by transactions with US
investors.61
Regarding hybrid entities, Danish tax law provides
that a domestic taxable entity will be recharacterized as
a tax transparent entity if certain requirements are
met,62 namely (1) the taxable entity is an entity resi-
dent in Denmark or a PE of a foreign resident com-
pany, (2) the Danish taxable entity is disregarded for
foreign tax purposes, (3) the income of the Danish
company is included in the taxable income of the con-
trolled foreign legal entity, i.e. an entity that owns
more than 50% of the Danish company or holds more
than 50% of the voting rights in a Danish company
and (4) the foreign country is a member of the
European Economic Area (EEA) or a tax treaty partner
of Denmark.63 If all these requirements are satisfied,
the entity (i.e. the Danish entity) will be treated as a
branch of the controlled foreign legal entity.64 As to
reverse hybrid entities, Danish tax law provides for a
recharacterization of Danish tax transparent entities as
taxable entities if certain requirements are met, namely
that (1) the direct owners/partners holding more than
50% of the capital or voting rights are tax residents in
one or more foreign jurisdictions, the Faroe Islands or
Greenland65 and (2) the jurisdiction in which the own-
ers are tax resident either regards the Danish entity as a
separate taxable entity or it does not exchange informa-
tion with the Danish tax authorities.66
The Danish anti-hybrid rules still leave open ques-
tions regarding their true effectiveness.67 For example
the Danish rules require that a domestic taxable entity
be recharacterized as tax transparent so that the
income of a Danish entity is included in the parent
company (US parent), which is assumed to be a con-
trolled foreign entity. Therefore, no recharacterization
will occur in all cases where the Danish company has
no operating income in a specific taxable year.68
Moreover, the Danish rules do not clarify whether
they apply in cases of a US taxpayer considering the
Danish entity as tax transparent, although without
making use of the check-the-box election,69 for exam-
ple due to the default rules of classification in the
United States.70
However, and all in all, the Danish anti-hybrid entity
mismatch rules represent a concrete example of how
granting supremacy to the tax characterization rules in
the residence state of the majority of the investors holding
ownership in the entity is indeed a more direct and
substantial way to deal with issues concerning hybrid
entity mismatches.
Notes
61 These rules were indeed a targeted reaction to the characterization of entities derived specifically from the use of the check-the-box regulations in the United States. A.
Møllin Ottosen & M. Nørremark, New Anti-Avoidance Rules in Denmark Targets Reverse Hybrids and Convertible Bonds, 62(11) Bull. Int’l Tax’n 513 (2008). See also J.
Bundgaard, Coordination Rules as a Weapon in the War against Cross-Border Tax Arbitrage: The Case of Hybrid Entities and Hybrid Financial Instruments, 67(4/5) Bull. Int’l Tax’n
200–201 (2013). For an explanation and references as regards the US check-the-box rules, see supra n. 34.
62 DK: s. 2A Corporate Income Tax Law [Selskabsskatteloven (SEL)], adopted by Bill 119 of 17 Dec. 2003. See also J. Wittendorff, Denmark’s Hovmand Clarifies Pending
Transparent Entities Legislation, 33(9) Tax Notes Int’l 758 (2004). See also Dell’Anese, supra n. 5, at 254.
63 J. Wittendorff, Danish Parliament Enacts Transparent Entity Legislation, 34 Tax Notes Int’l 1 (2004). See also Wittendorff, supra n. 62.
64 This does not mean that the entity is now entitled to claim a deduction for payments made to the foreign parent company or to group-related entities also treated as fiscally
transparent under the law of the residence state of the foreign company. In addition, dividends paid from the Danish entity to the foreign controlled legal entity are not
subject to withholding tax. See A. Riis & P. E. Lytken, Denmark-Corporate Taxation, s. 10, Country Analyses IBFD (accessed 16 Sept. 2018). However, as Wittendorff states:
‘[ … ] if there is a direct link between external borrowings by the foreign parent company and the loan granted to the transparent entity, the interest paid by the foreign
parent should be allocable to the transparent entity in accordance with ordinary principles of PE taxation’. Wittendorff, supra n. 62. See also Dell’Anese, supra n. 5, at 254–
255.
65 There direct owners do not need to be affiliated parties. They may indeed be separate companies or individuals that reside in foreign countries and which together hold more
than 50% of the capital or voting power. Likewise, non-Danish entities and branches that are treated as tax transparent in their country of organization are disregarded for
purposes of determining direct ownership. This is especially relevant in the case where a taxpayer decides to use an intermediary company between the US owners and the
Danish transparent entity, which is deemed to be transparent in its country of organization but a taxable entity in the United States. In such a case, the entity is disregarded
for purposes of determining who is the direct owner of the Danish entity. Møllin Ottosen & Nørremark, supra n. 61, at 514.
66 An exception applies as regards venture funds investing in medium and small-sized companies. Bundgaard, supra n. 61, at 202.
67 For a complete analysis of this matter, see Parada, supra n. 3, at 162–172.
68 Parada, supra n. 3, at 164.
69 For references to the US check-the-box regulations, see supra n. 34.
70 In the absence of an election, the tax status of a foreign business in the United States is settled by default rules based on limited liability and the number of owners of the
foreign entity. US: Treas. Reg. Sec. 301.7701–3(c)(1)(iv). I.e. a foreign eligible entity will be considered a partnership if it has two or more members and at least one of them
does not have limited liability; as an association taxable as a corporation, if all members have limited liability; and as a disregarded entity if an eligible entity has a single
owner who does not have limited liability. US: Treas. Reg. Sec. 301.7701–3(b)(2)(1)(A),(B) & (C). For an explanation of the check-the-box rules in the United States, see
supra n. 34.
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3.2.3.2 Recommendation 5.2 of the OECD BEPS
Action 2 Final Report
A rule similar to the Danish tax rule on reverse hybrid
entities was recommended as part of the OECD BEPS
Action 2 Final Report.71 According to Recommendation
5.2, the tax transparency treatment of an entity in its
country of establishment should be limited, such that a
tax transparent entity should be rather treated as a taxable
entity in the country of its establishment to the extent
that such entity derives foreign source income that is not
otherwise subject to taxation in the country of its estab-
lishment and that such income is allocated under the
domestic law of that country (country of establishment)
to non-resident investors that are in the same control
group as the reverse hybrid entity.72 Indeed, as stated in
the text of the Action 2 Final Report:
The recommendation only applies in circumstances
where: a) the person is tax transparent under the laws
of the establishment jurisdiction; b) the person derives
foreign source income or income that is not otherwise
subject to taxation in the establishment jurisdiction; c)
all or part of that income is allocated under the laws of
the establishment jurisdiction to a non-resident inves-
tor that is in the same control group as that person.73
This can be illustrated using the facts of Figure 11.
Assume therefore that BSub, a tax transparent entity
established in State B and wholly owned by ACo, a
company resident in State A, receives interest payments
from CSbub1, a sub-subsidiary that is established in a
third State C.74
In this case, all the requirements for the application of
Recommendation 5.2 would be met. First, there is a
person (BSub) that is regarded as tax transparent under
the laws of the state of establishment (State B). Second,
that person derives foreign-source income (interest from
State C) that is not otherwise subject to taxation in the
establishment jurisdiction (State B). Indeed, as State B
regards BSub as fiscally transparent, there is no taxation of
that income in State B. Third, the establishment jurisdic-
tion (State B) allocates the income to a non-resident (ACo)
that is in the same control group as that person (BSub).
Therefore, the tax transparency treatment of BSub in State
B will limited to treat BSub as a taxable entity in State B.
In other words, Recommendation 5.2 appears to be a rule
granting priority to the tax characterization of the entity
in the state where the majority its investors are resi-
dents – very similar to the Danish rule analysed above.75
As to the outcome of its application, it eliminates the
mismatch as regards the tax characterization of BSub and
ensures that the interest payments are recognized as
income in State B.
Nevertheless, Recommendation 5.2 still leaves some
open questions. First, and as emphasized elsewhere by
this author,76 such a rule should be properly coordinated
Figure 15 Recommendation 5.2 of the OECD BEPS Action 2 Final Report
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Interest 
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State C 
Notes
71 OECD, Action 2: 2015 Final Report, supra n. 2, at 64–65.
72 The BEPS Action 2 Final Report states: ‘Two persons are in the same control group if: (1) they are consolidated for accounting purposes; (2) the first person has an
investment that provides that person with effective control of the second person or there is a third person that holds the investment which provides that person with effective
control over both persons; (3) the first person has a 50% or greater investment in the second person or there is a third person that holds a 50% or greater investment in both;
or (4) they can be regarded as associated enterprises under Art. 9 [of the OECD Model]’. OECD, Action 2: 2015 Final Report, supra n. 2, at 113.
73 OECD, Action 2: 2015 Final Report, supra n. 2, at 113.
74 The example also assumes that the loan is made at arm’s length and that resulting interest is calculated and charged accordingly.
75 However, unlike the Danish rule, the OECD does not make any references to the lack of information exchanged between the state of the investors and the entity’s state of
establishment as a factor to trigger the application of the rule. This appears indeed to be a unique feature of the Danish tax law. Supra n. 66.
76 Parada, supra n. 1.
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with the application of CFC rules in the state of the
investors controlling the reverse hybrid entity. Indeed,
taking the example in Figure 15, nothing prevents the
application of CFC rules by State A – which might
ultimately give rise to double taxation.77 Second, and
unlike this author’s proposals, Recommendation 5.2 is
not designed to replace the OECD linking rules, but
rather to coexist with them. This could bring new pro-
blems to the table. For example if, as in the Figure 15,
State C introduces linking rules, nothing would prevent
State C from denying an interest deduction before the
application of Recommendation 5.2, even though the
interest would also be included as ordinary income in
State B by the recharacterization of BSub as a taxable
entity. In other words, economic double taxation would
arise. Both issues are illustrated below.
Other concerns as regards Recommendation 5.2
refer to issues of legal certainty and non-
discrimination.78 Indeed, considering that tax trans-
parency is an effective way to attract foreign investors
and to ensure tax neutrality among them, non-resident
taxpayers might be rightfully concerned by the fact
that electing to do business in a country through a tax
transparent entity does not guarantee that in the
future such tax transparency will be respected. This
could ultimately reduce the attractiveness of invest-
ment in that place.79 Similarly, implementing a rule
that provides for a recharacterization of a tax transpar-
ent entity only as regards non-resident investors might
be considered discriminatory.80 This is especially rele-
vant in the context of the European Union and funda-
mental freedoms.81
Figure 16 Recommendation 5.2, CFC Legislation and OECD Linking Rules
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State B 
BSub 
Interest 
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CSub 1 
State C 
Primary Response 
remains applicable
CFC rules are potentially 
applicable  
The tax transparency treatment of BSub in State B is replaced by treating BSub as a taxable 
entity. Interest are thus included as ordinary income. 
Notes
77 This issue is recognized in the BEPS Action 2 Final Report when it states: ‘By treating the entity as a resident taxpayer, this will eliminate the need to apply the reverse
hybrid rule to such entities and the investor jurisdiction could continue to include such payments in income under Recommendation 5.1 but provide a credit for any taxes
paid in the establishment jurisdiction on the income i.e. brought into account under such rules’. OECD, Action 2: 2015 Final Report, supra n. 2, at 65. This potential double
taxation issue was also already emphasized in s. 3.2.2.2. In practice, however, granting relief from double taxation if income received by the reverse hybrid (now a taxable
entity by application of recommendation 5.2) is taxed also in the state where the majority of the investors are residents, should not be the true concern, especially because
most countries around the world provide for relief in the case of double taxation. See e.g. supra n. 14.
78 This has been also emphasized elsewhere by this author. Parada, supra n. 1.
79 E.g. in the United States the taxation of partnerships or pass-through entities is certainly more beneficial, especially because of the avoidance of economic double taxation. As
McDaniel et al. has stated: ‘Since the partnership is treated as a conduit for tax purposes, profits are taxed only once, in contrast to the taxation of corporate profits, first when
earned by the corporation, and again, when distributed to shareholders’. P. McDaniel, M. McMahon, Jr. & D. Simmons, Federal Income Taxation of Partnerships and S
Corporations 1 (4th ed., Foundation Press 2006).
80 Even if Recommendation 5.2 were to be applicable without distinguishing between resident and non-resident taxpayers, such a measure might not ensure that hidden or
tacit discrimination still exists. Indeed, hybrid entity mismatches can arise only in cross-border situations. Parada, supra n. 1. In a similar opinion, but analysing the OECD
linking rules, see A. Rust, BEPS Action 2: 2014 Deliverable – Neutralizing the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements and its Compatibility with the Non-Discrimination Provisions
in Tax Treaties and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 3 Brit. Tax Rev. 313, 320 (2015).
81 The ECJ conducts an analysis involving different phases in order to determine whether a national rule might be viewed as discriminatory. First, the ECJ determines which of
the fundamental freedoms is indeed potentially infringed. Second, and once this analysis has been completed, the Court compares the situation of the complaining taxpayer
(normally a non-resident with economic connection with the host country) with a comparable domestic situation in order to determine whether these two situations are
treated equally. If the result of this second phase is that the national rule is discriminatory, there must still be justifications grounds for discrimination. Finally, the third
stage involves a test of proportionality. I.e. even if a justification ground justifies the discriminatory measure, the rule must be regarded as proportional. R. Mason & M.
Knoll, What Is Discrimination? 121(5) Yale L. J. 1014 (2012). For an in-depth analysis of the principle of non-discrimination under EU Law, see N. Bammens, The Principle of
Non-Discrimination in International and European Tax Law, IBFD Doctoral Series, vol. 24 (IBFD 2012).
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Finally, and although beyond the limited scope of this
article, one should bear in mind that Recommendation
5.2 could also have an impact on tax treaties, especially as
regards the application of the new Article 1(2) of the
OECD Model.82 Generally speaking, Article 1(2) of the
OECD Model helps to determine who should be entitled
to the benefits of a bilateral tax treaty when an item of
income is received by or through a tax transparent entity
treated as such by one or both contracting states.83 If that
is the case, Article 1(2) of the OECD Model will grant
treaty benefits to the residents of the state treating the
entity as tax transparent, who are normally the owners or
partners of the entity, at least in the case of a partnership.-
84 Therefore, it is evident that if a state limits the tax
transparency of an entity so as to treat it as a taxable
entity (Recommendation 5.2), this will impact in the
scope of Article 1(2) and the general application of the
income tax treat treaty between the state of the investors’
residence and the source state in a triangular situation like
that illustrated in Figure 16. In such a case, both con-
tracting states will regard the entity receiving the income
as a non-transparent entity. Therefore, Article 1(2) of the
OECD Model would no longer be necessary.
This should not necessarily be viewed as something
negative, especially because the outcomes of Article 1(2)
of the OECD Model are not always desirable.85 A similar
effect as regards tax treaties can be achieved with respect
to the Danish anti-hybrid rules86 and Article 9a of the
ATAD 2.87
All in all, and as noted, while Recommendation 5.2 is
not an unassailable solution, it is a very positive step in
the right direction, especially towards achieving more
fundamental solutions as regards reverse hybrid entity
mismatches.88
3.2.3.3 EU ATAD 2: Article 9a (reverse hybrids)
Article 9a of the EU ATAD 2 deals with cases where a
deductible payment is received by a tax transparent entity
established in an EU Member State while the same entity
is treated by the majority of its owners, located in a non-
EU Member State, as a taxable entity. In other words, it
refers specifically to cases of reverse hybrid entities receiv-
ing deductible payments.89
The rule works in a very similar way as the proposal
explained in section 3.2.1, namely that the entity in the
Notes
82 For a complete analysis of the new Art. 1(2) of the OECD Model, see A. Nikolakakis et al., Some Reflections on the Proposed Revisions to the OECD Model and Commentaries, and on
the Multilateral Instrument, with respect to Fiscally Transparent Entities, Brit. Tax Rev. 3 (2017), republished in two parts as A. Nikolakakis et al., Some Reflections on the Proposed
Revisions to the OECD Model and Commentaries, and on the Multilateral Instrument, with Respect to Fiscally Transparent Entities – Part 1, 71 Bull. Int’l Tax’n 9 (2017) and A.
Nikolakakis et al., Some Reflections on the Proposed Revisions to the OECD Model and Commentaries, and on the Multilateral Instrument, with Respect to Fiscally Transparent
Entities – Part 2, 71 Bull. Int’l Tax’n 10 (2017). More recently, for a critical analysis of the impact of Art. 1(2) of the OECD Model, see D. Sanghavi, BEPS Hybrid Entities
Proposal: A Slippery Slope, Especially for Developing Countries, 85 Tax Notes Int’l 4 (2017); D. Sanghavi, Structural Issues in the Income Tax Treaty Network: Towards a Coherent
Framework 270–272 (Maastricht PhD thesis 2018). More recently in this critical approach as regards Art. 1(2) of the OECD Model, see Parada, supra n. 4.
83 Art. 1(2) of the OECD Model reads as follows: ‘For the purposes of this Convention, income derived by or through an entity or arrangement i.e. treated as wholly or partly
fiscally transparent under the taxation law of either Contracting State shall be considered to be income of a resident of a Contracting State but only to the extent that the
income is treated, for purposes of the taxation by that State, as income of a resident of that State’. OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital: Condensed Version 2017
(OECD Publishing 2017). This wording resembles Art. 1(6) of the US Model in the 2006 and 2016 versions, which were the first positive recognitions of the principles
settled by the OECD Partnership Report in 1999. For the text of Art. 1(6) US Model 2006, see US: Dept. of the Treasury, United States Model Income Tax Convention of 15
November 2006, Art. 1(6) & United States Model Technical Explanation Accompanying the United States Model Income Tax Convention of 15 November 2006. For the 2016 text, see
United States Model Income Tax Convention of 17 Feb. 2016, Art. 1(6). A technical explanation of the 2016 US Model has not been published at the time of writing. For a
comparative analysis of both the OECD Model and US Model provisions, see e.g. J. Kollmann, A. Roncarati & C. Staringer, Treaty Entitlement for Fiscally Transparent Entities:
Art. 1(2) of the OECD Model Convention, in Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS): The Proposals to Revise the OECD Model Convention (M. Lang, P. Pistone, A. Rust et al. eds,
Linde 2016). For the 1999 OECD Partnership Report, see OECD, The Application of the OECD Model Tax Convention to Partnerships (OECD Publishing 20 Jan. 1999). For
criticism of the OECD Partnership Report, see M. Lang, The Application of the OECD Model Tax Convention to Partnerships, A Critical Analysis of the Report Prepared by the OECD
(Wolters Kluwer 2000). See also R. Danon, Qualification of Taxable Entities and Treaty Protection, 68 Bull. Int’l Tax’n 4/5 (2014). For a more recent analysis of the principles of
the 1999 OECD Partnership Report, see H. Ault, The Partnership Report Revisited: BEPS, the Multilateral Convention, and the 2017 OECD Model Convention, in Tax Treaties
After the BEPS Project: A Tribute to Jacques Sasseville, 23–26 (B. J. Arnold ed., Canadian Tax Foundation 2018).
84
‘[ … ] Art. 1(2) of the OECD Model simply determines who should be entitled to the benefits of a double tax treaty. Therefore, there will always be the need to look at the
specific provision governing the allocation of taxing rights within the treaty in order to ascertain whether or not the tax treaty benefits are finally granted’. Parada, supra n. 4,
at 343.
85 Parada stresses two main issues as regards the application of Art. 1(2) of the OECD Model. First, Art. 1(2) of the OECD Model would not be appropriately designed to
interact with other distributive rules, especially with the beneficial ownership requirement in Arts 10, 11 and 12 of the OECD Model. Sanghavi has also made reference to
this issue in what he calls the ‘economic anomalies’ of Art. 1(2) of the OECD Model. Sanghavi, BEPS Hybrid Entities Proposal, supra n. 82, at 361–362 (Figure 2). Second,
Art. 1(2) of the OECD Model would maintain an unjustified preference for the interests of the residence state over those of the source state. For a full analysis, see Parada,
supra n. 4, at 349–357.
86 See s. 3.2.3.1.
87 See s. 3.2.3.3.
88 Parada, supra n. 1.
89 Art. 9a of the ATAD 2 reads as follows: ‘Where one or more associated non-resident entities holding in aggregate a direct or indirect interest in 50% or more of the voting
rights, capital interests or rights to a share of profit in a hybrid entity i.e. incorporated or established in a Member State, are located in a jurisdiction or jurisdictions that
regard the hybrid entity as a taxable person, the hybrid entity shall be regarded as a resident of that Member State and taxed on its income to the extent that this income is
not otherwise taxed under the laws of the Member State or any other jurisdiction’. Art. 9a(1) Council Directive 2017/952/EU of 29 May 2017 (ATAD 2). For a further
analysis of Art. 9a of the ATAD 2, see Fibbe & Stevens, supra n. 36. The first proposal of the EU ATAD 2 was issued on 25 Oct. 2016. Subsequently, it derived in a second
draft published on 2 Dec. 2016. A final text was made public on 17 Feb. 2017, which was accepted by the European Council during the ECOFIN meeting of 21 Feb. 2017.
See European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive 2016/1164/EU as regards hybrid mismatches with third countries, COM (2016) 687 final, (25 Oct.
2016). See also Council of the European Union, Proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive 2016/1164/EU as regards hybrid mismatches with third countries, 6333/17 FISC
46 ECOFIN 95, (17 Feb. 2017). The text of 29 May 2017 did not vary from that of 17 Feb. 2017.
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EU is recharacterized for tax purposes in order to avoid
a hybrid entity mismatch. That is, this is a coordination
rule that grants priority to the tax characterization rules
in the state where the majority of the investors are
residents, which is indeed a deviation from the OECD
approach of matching tax outcomes.90 Yet, unlike the
proposal in section 3.2.1 of this article, Article 9a of
the EU ATAD 2 still possesses a very consequentialist
approach. As noted in the wording of the provision, the
EU fiscally transparent entity will be treated as a tax-
able one ‘ … to the extent that this income is not
otherwise taxed under the laws of the Member State or
any other jurisdiction’.91 Therefore, double non-taxation
still appears to be a necessary condition for the applica-
tion of the rule.
There is a similarity between the anti-hybrid rule in
the EU ATAD 2 on the one hand, and the Danish anti-
reverse hybrid rule92 and Recommendation 5.2 of the
BEPS Action Plan on the other.93 Indeed, all of these
rules not only share a similar wording, but also target
the core issue regarding hybrid entity mismatches,
namely the disparate tax characterization of the entities.
This is particularly relevant, as the application of
Article 9a of the EU ATAD 2 appears to take priority
over the rule contained in Article 9(2) of the EU ATAD
2, i.e. linking rules. This hierarchy would also confirm
that, at least in cases involving reverse hybrid entity
mismatches, there would be no need to rely on the
OECD linking rules.94
Although Article 9a of the EU ATAD 2 is not
entirely effective,95 it is another significant example
where a rule granting supremacy to the tax character-
ization rules in the state where the majority of the
investors are residents, makes more sense than a rule
based exclusively on matching tax outcomes, especially
in a coordinated regional context such as the European
Union.96
3.3. Supremacy of the Tax Characterization
Rules of the Home State
3.3.1 The Proposal
This concept was recently proposed in the international
tax literature and might work as a very suitable alter-
native to the current OECD linking rules.97 Generally
speaking, the proposal relies on a domestic rule that
aligns the tax characterization of foreign entities for
domestic tax purposes in accordance with the tax char-
acterization given to them in the country where the
relevant entity is formally and legally established or
incorporated, i.e. the home state. This rule could be
introduced as a domestic rule using the following
wording:
Where according to the rules of a State, a different tax
characterization is given to the same entity, the tax
characterization given to the entity by the State where
the entity is legally and formally organized, shall be
followed by the other State.98
The whole idea of granting supremacy to the tax charac-
terization rules in the home state, i.e. where the entity is
legally and formally organized, will avoid any confusion
regarding source and home countries, as both categories
might not necessarily coincide when one refers to hybrid
Notes
90 Taking a similar position, see Fibbe & Stevens, supra n. 36, at 164. It also resembles Recommendation 5.2. of the Action 2 Final Report. OECD, Action 2: 2015 Final Report,
supra n. 2, at 64–65. See also s. 3.2.3.2.
91 See s. 3.2.3.1.
92 Ibid.
93 See s. 3.2.3.2.
94 This seems to be confirmed in recital 29 of the preamble of the Directive, which provides: ‘The hybrid mismatch rules in Art. 9(1) and (2) only apply to the extent that the
situation involving a taxpayer gives rise to a mismatch outcome. No mismatch outcome should arise when an arrangement is subject to adjustments under Art. 9(5) or 9a
and, accordingly, arrangements that are subject to adjustment under those parts of this Directive should not be subject to any further adjustment under the hybrid mismatch
rules’. EU ATAD 2, rec. 29. This seems also to be the rule when CFC rules might solve the reverse hybrid entity mismatch first. According to recital 30 of EU ATAD 2:
‘Where the provisions of another directive, such as those in Council Directive 2011/96/EU (EU ATAD 1), lead to the neutralization of the mismatch in tax outcomes, there
should be no scope for the application of the hybrid mismatch rules provided for in this Directive’. Id., rec. 30. This is also confirmed in the OECD BEPS Action 2 Final
Report. OECD, Action 2: 2015 Final Report, supra n. 2, at 64.
95 E.g. the rule is not effective to resolve cases where the tax transparent entity is organized in a non-EU Member State, even though the EU investors own more than 50% of
the entity, and it receives payment from either a non-EU state or an EU Member State. In such cases, the mismatch will be avoided either by the application of CFC rules in
the country in which the investors are resident, or by reliance on the OECD primary response in the country in which the payer is resident. For further analysis, see Fibbe &
Stevens, supra n. 36, at 165.
96 For a more in-depth analysis of Art. 9a of the ATAD 2, see Parada, supra n. 3, at 181–184. See also Parada supra n. 1.
97 The proposal relies on three main tax policy aims, namely (1) simplicity, (2) coherence and (3) ease of administration, and it attempts to be a suitable alternative to the
OECD linking rules. For a full comprehensive analysis of this proposal, see Parada, supra n. 3, at 353–398.
98 The proposal does not attempt to harmonize the characterization of entities around the world, but rather to create a rule that allows a ‘coordinated reaction’ when dealing
with hybrid and reverse hybrid entities (‘reactive coordination rule’). Parada, supra n. 3, at 354. In addition, the proposed rule does not attempt to coordinate the legal
characterization of entities in the sense of the existence of entities for all legal purposes. Instead, the subject of coordination proposed by the rule is the specific tax
characterization given to legal entities in different jurisdictions, which is indeed the reason for the existence of hybrids and reverse hybrid entities. This clarification is
necessary, as the proposed wording for the rule might be erroneously interpreted as coordination of the legal characterization when it states: ‘ … the tax characterization
given to that entity where the entity is organized … ’, especially because of the reference to ‘where the entity is organized’. Nevertheless, the clear reference to ‘tax
characterization’ and not ‘legal characterization’ of an entity makes evident the target of the rule. This is critical to avoid confusion in those countries where the legal
characterization and tax characterization of the entities will not necessarily coincide.
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and reverse hybrid entity structures.99 Accordingly, it
possesses the advantage of certainty, as the place where
the entity is formally and legally organized (home state)
is – by default – only one place, even in cases of legal
entities organized at a supranational level, because even in
those cases there is ultimately still a reference to one
jurisdiction.100 More importantly, the rule will provide
a more direct approach to deal with hybrid entities in
which disparities in the tax characterization will become
the central element in the design of the rule, also reducing
the contingency and complexity of its application.101
Nonetheless, special attention should be paid to the aim
not to generate improper tax planning incentives and new
abusive practices.102
The specific implications of this proposal must be distin-
guished between cases involving hybrid and reverse hybrid
entities and relevant payments made from or received by
these entities. These implications are analysed below.
3.3.2 Illustrations
3.3.2.1 Cases Involving Hybrid Entities
Granting supremacy to the tax characterization rules in the
home state will eliminate any possibility of mismatches as
regards the tax characterization of the same entity between
two jurisdictions. In other words, the issue of hybrid entities
will be reduced practically to zero.103 Notably, also, in all
the cases involving hybrid entities either making a deduc-
tible payment or receiving it, the tax outcome will be a
deduction/inclusion. Therefore, granting supremacy to the
tax characterization rules in the home state should also
satisfy those concerned about single taxation.
Assume that BSub is an entity legally and formally
organized as a corporation in State B. Accordingly, BSub
is controlled by ACo, a corporation legally and formally
organized in State A. While State B treats BSub as a
taxable entity, State A regards BSub as a tax transparent
entity. Assume three scenarios: (1) BSub makes deductible
interest payments to ACo, (2) BSub receives deductible
interest payments from a third party in State X and (3)
BSub receives deductible interest payments from ACo in
State A.
Figure 17 Coordination in the Home State and Hybrid
Entities (Scenarios 1, 2 and 3)
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State B 
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Scenario 1 
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Scenario 2
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Scenario 3 
Coordination in the ‘home state’ means that BSub will be 
considered as a taxable entity in all States involved in the 
transaction. The outcome in the case a hybrid entity makes or 
receives a payment will thus always be a deduction/inclusion under 
the application of this coordination rule. 
State X 
Granting supremacy to the tax characterization rules in
the state where the entity is legally and formally organized
(i.e. State B) means that State A – Scenario 1 and Scenario
3 – and State X (source state of the interest) – Scenario
2 – will follow the tax characterization of BSub in State B,
where the entity is treated as a taxable entity. Therefore, in
all the three hypotheticals, the hybrid entity mismatch is not
only eliminated, but the interest will also be included as
income in at least one state. This proves one of the main
hypotheses of this article, namely that even though a rule
granting supremacy to the tax characterization rules in the
home state is not designed based on the outcome of the
transaction (particularly, double non-taxation), it can be
very effective in achieving a single tax result.104
Notes
99 E.g. while the source state and home state coincide in all those cases where a hybrid entity makes a payment, they do not do so when the hybrid entity receives a payment.
Similarly, whilst the home and source countries of a reverse hybrid making a payment might be the same, these two categories do not coincide when a reverse hybrid entity
receives a payment. This therefore reaffirms the idea of referring to the home state. Parada, supra n. 3, at 356.
100 E.g. the European Company (SE), the European Cooperative Society (SCE) or the European Economic Interest Grouping (EEIG) are legal forms that, to a large extent, are
governed by uniform EU law, but which are still partly regulated by the national provisions of the MS of incorporation. See Council Regulation (EC) No 2157/2001 of 8 Oct.
2001 on the Statute for a European company (SE), OJ L 204/01 (10 Nov. 2001); Council Regulation (EC) No 1435/2003 of 22 July 2003 on the Statute for a European
Cooperative Society (SCE) OJ L 207/03 (18 Aug. 2003); Council Regulation (EEC) No 2137/85 of 25 July 1985 on the EEIG, OJ L 199/1 (31 July 1985).
101 Unlike the OECD linking rules, the proposed coordination in the home state pays attention exclusively to the tax characterization of the entity under analysis in the state
where it is formally and legally organized. Therefore, although contingent in such a way, it avoids the sequential mechanism of primary response and defensive rule, which
provides for an extreme dependency on foreign law. For that reason, it is also clear that complexity is reduced, as tax administrations should pay attention only to the tax
treatment of the entity where it is organized – a very clear issue when the test is applied to domestic entities – avoiding the complexities in determining whether the
payments involved in the transaction where included as ordinary income or whether a proper deduction was granted. Parada, supra n. 3, at 363–364. See also s. 4.2.3.
102 This analysis certainly exceeds the purpose of this article. However, this author recognizes that granting supremacy to the tax characterization rules in the home state might
create a wrong incentive to incorporate or to establish entities in specific jurisdictions whose tax treatment might be considered in advance as desirable, ultimately creating
new tax planning opportunities. For further analysis, see s. 4.2.3.
103 This is true only to the extent the rule is implemented worldwide and room is not left for gaps. See Parada, supra n. 3, at 397. See also s. 4.2.3.
104 See s. 2, Hypothesis 3. However, it is evident that effective taxation will ultimately depend of the total amount of income and expenses at the level of BSub in State B
(Scenarios 2 and 3) or the total amount of income and expenses at the level of ACo in State A (Scenario 1). Therefore, strictly speaking, neither this coordination rules nor the
OECD linking rules can appropriately guarantee ‘effective’ single taxation, but rather only the inclusion of the deductible interest payments in at least one state, which is
arguably a synonym for single effective taxation.
Hybrid Entity Mismatches: Exploring Three Alternatives for Coordination
43
Yet, Scenario 2 can still bring new potential double
taxation issues. Indeed, although the interest payments
from State X (the source state) are recognized as ordinary
income in State B, nothing prevents State A from also
applying its CFC rules and exercising its taxing rights on
those interest payments. However, as emphasized already
in this article, this issue is more hypothetical than prac-
tical, as countries around the world normally provide
double taxation relief in such situations.105
3.3.2.2 Cases Involving Reverse Hybrid Entities
Granting supremacy to the tax characterization rules in
the home state means that in the case of reverse hybrid
entities receiving deductible payments, those payments
will be recognized as ordinary income in the state of the
investor without the need to rely on CFC rules.106
Consider the following simple triangular example.
BSub is a tax transparent entity established in State B
and wholly owned by a company (ACo) established in
State A. Accordingly, BSub has a subsidiary in a third
State C (CSub1) from which it receives deductible interest
payments. While BSub is indeed a tax transparent entity
in its state of establishment (State B), State A (and State
C) regard BSub as a taxable entity.
A coordination rule granting supremacy to the tax
characterization rules in the home state will imply that
BSub is regarded as a tax transparent entity in States A
and C, as well. Therefore, the hybrid entity mismatch
disappears and the reliance on CFC rules to solve the
mismatch in tax outcomes will become unnecessary.
Indeed, ACo will recognize the deductible interest pay-
ments as ordinary income in State A due to the tax
transparency treatment of BSub. This should also satisfy
those who argue for ensuring single taxation in cases
involving reverse hybrid entities,107 and proves again
that coordination can also be very effective in achieving
a single tax result.108
Nonetheless, granting supremacy to the tax character-
ization rules in the home state might raise some concerns
in cases where a reverse hybrid entity makes deductible
payments either to a third-state entity or to the state of
the investors controlling the recipient entity. Consider the
facts of Figure 18, with the only difference that a deduc-
tible payment of interest is made from BSub to CSub1.
If a coordination rule granting supremacy to the tax
characterization rules in the home state (State B) is
applied, BSub will be regarded as a tax transparent entity
in States A and C, as well. This will generate a deduction
in State A which would not exist in absence of the
application of this rule. In other words, without this
coordination rule in the home country, State A would
regard BSub as a taxable entity and no deduction for the
interest paid would be allowed. However, the coordina-
tion under the tax characterization rules in State B will
generate a benefit (deduction) for ACo which would not
Figure 18 Coordination in the Home State and Deductible Payments Received by Reverse Hybrid Entities
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State B 
Interest 
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CSub 1 
State C 
Coordination in the ‘home state’ means that  BSsub will be regarded as a tax transparent 
entity in State A and in State C as well. The rule solves thus the hybrid entity mismatch  
without need of relying on CFC legislation in State A. 
BSub 
Notes
105 E.g. supra n. 14 & supra n. 104.
106 This is indeed the same outcome that ‘coordination at source’ arrives at when a third source state (in a similar triangular situation) regards the entity (BSub) as tax
transparent. See supra Figure 5.
107 However, the single taxation outcome is true only to the extent that ACo has a positive taxable income for that taxable year.
108 This author has already raised some concerns as regards ensuring effective single taxation. See e.g. supra n. 13 and 104.
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exist otherwise. This might be considered unfair. This is
the reason why the original proposal for a coordination
rule granting supremacy to the tax characterization rules
in the home state contemplates the possibility to ‘switch-
off’ (disapply) the rule in these cases.109 This means that
the coordination rule could be suspended for these trian-
gular cases where a reverse hybrid is making a payment to
a party in a third country.110
Similarly, a coordination rule granting supremacy to the
tax characterization rules in the home state might also raise
concerns in cases where a reverse hybrid entity is making a
deductible payment to a party in the country of the investors
controlling the recipient entity. In these cases, and by the
sole application of the coordination rule, the loan transaction
will be disregarded for tax purposes. In other words, a tax
benefit will arise only by granting supremacy to the tax
characterization rules in the home state.
This can be illustrated by using the same facts in
Figure 18, with the only difference that BSub makes
deductible interest payments to ACo.
Figure 19 Coordination in the Home State and Deductible Payments Made by a Reverse Hybrid Entity to a Third Country
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A ‘switch-off’ of the coordination rule might be applied  in this case. The above should be 
perfectly acceptable since the outcome of this triangular transaction was not seen as 
problematic before the application of this coordination rule. 
Figure 20 Coordination in the Home State and Payments Made by a Reverse Hybrid Entity to Its Controlling Investor
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BSub will be considered as tax transparent entity in State A, State B (home state) and State 
C. This means that the loan transaction between ACo and BSub will be completely 
disregarded for tax purposes. In addition, a deduction can be generated in State C. 
Notes
109 Parada, supra n. 3, at 365–368.
110 The switching-off does not require further elaboration, as it implies merely that countries including the ‘reactive coordination rule’ (coordination in the home state) might
opt not to apply the rule in this particular triangular case, namely where a hybrid entity makes a payment to a third state. Introducing a specific exception under domestic
law could do this. Parada, supra n. 3, at 367.
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If a coordination rule granting supremacy to the tax
characterization rules in the home state applies, BSub will
be regarded as a tax transparent entity not only in State B
(the home state), but also in State A and State C. That is,
the loan transaction between ACo and BSub will be
completely disregarded for tax purposes, i.e. no interest
deduction will be allowed in State B, nor will there be an
inclusion of income in State A. Moreover, a deduction in
State C might arise now that State C also regards BSub as
a tax transparent entity. All of these outcomes are the
exclusive result of the application of this coordination
rule, which might still raise some concerns. For this
purpose, the original proposal for a coordination rule
granting supremacy to the tax characterization rules in
the home state contemplated the possibility to switch off
the rule in cases where the sole application of the rule
would grant some tax benefits that did not exist in
absence of the rule.111 However, the possibility to switch
off the rule should, in any case, be interpreted as either a
contradiction or a defect of the proposed coordination
rule.112
Finally, taking the example in Figure 20, but with the
sole difference that ACo pays interest to BSub, a coordina-
tion rule granting supremacy to the tax characterization
rules in the home state could also achieve a positive result.
First, the hybrid entity mismatch is eliminated. Second,
the outcome – for those concerned with single taxa-
tion – will be a non-deduction/inclusion, i.e. the loan
transaction between ACo and BSub is disregarded for tax
purposes (non-deduction),113 as the interest income will
be recognized as such in State C.114
3.3.3 Practical Examples in Support of This Proposal
Some examples of granting supremacy to the tax charac-
terization rules in the home state can be found as an
interpretation of the Spanish tax characterization rules,
as well as in the EU Common Consolidated Tax Base
(CCTB) Proposal.115 Both cases are briefly referred to
below, although without the intention of providing an
in-depth analysis, but rather merely to offer an insight
that allows the author to support the hypothetical analysis
already carried out in section 3.3.2.
3.3.3.1 Article 62(1) of the EU CCTB Proposal
Article 62(1) of the EU CCTB Proposal is a noteworthy
example to support the idea of a coordination rule
Figure 21 Coordination in the Home State and Deductible Payments Received by a Reverse Hybrid Entity from Its Investors
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BSub will be considered as tax transparent entity in State A, State B (home state) and State 
C. This means that the loan transaction between ACo and BSub will be still disregarded for 
tax purposes. In addition, the interest payments will be recognized as ordinary income in 
State C. 
Notes
111 Parada, supra n. 3, at 368–369.
112 Ibid.
113 This does not mean that a deduction is disallowed, but rather that there will be no deduction possible, because the transaction is not recognized for tax purposes.
114 However, this does not ensure taxation in State C. Indeed, if CSub1 has more expenses than income for that taxable year, there will be no payment of taxes. Similarly, if the
corporate income tax rate in State C is 0.01%, an economic result similar to non-taxation will be achieved. This demonstrates again the inconsistent idea behind single
taxation. For a further critique of single taxation and the concept of double non-taxation, see Parada, supra n. 3, at 13–51. Also on the topic of double non-taxation, see
Marchgraber, supra n. 3.
115 For an explanation of the Spanish rule as regards the tax characterization of entities for tax purposes, see s. 3.1.3.2.
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granting supremacy to the tax characterization rules in the
home state as a suitable proposal to replace the current
OECD linking rules. According to Article 62(1) of the
CCTB Proposal: ‘Where an entity is treated as tax trans-
parent in the Member State where it is established, a
taxpayer holding an interest in the entity shall include
its share in the income of the entity in its tax base’.116
Therefore, a taxpayer holding an interest in a tax trans-
parent entity established in a Member State must follow
the tax treatment given to it in the Member State where
the entity is established, which is indeed a coordination
rule.117
The proposed provision appears to apply indistinctly to
all partners of a partnership established within any EU
Member State, regardless of their percentage of ownership.
This certainly simplifies its application and brings the
provision closer to the author’s proposal in section 3.3.2.
Accordingly, as no distinction is made as regards cases
involving non-EU taxpayers holding an interest in EU tax
transparent entities, one could conclude that the rule is
not exclusively applicable to intra-EU hybrid entity mis-
matches. Such an interpretation should indeed be desir-
able, as the effectiveness of a coordination rule relies
exclusively on its extended scope. However, the limited
definition of ‘taxpayer’ in the CCTB Proposal causes this
author to conclude that Article 62 was conceived to be
applied exclusively in cases of intra-EU hybrid entity
mismatches.118 However, Article 62 appears not to be
applicable to reverse situations, i.e. cases when a
Member State – where the entity is established – treats
such an entity as tax opaque, while the state of the
taxpayer holding an ownership interest in that entity
treats it as tax transparent. That is, cases of hybrid enti-
ties. This clearly demonstrates that the ultimate aim of
the provision is to cover situations involving reverse
hybrid entities, although under a different approach in
comparison with other existing EU law provisions.119
Finally, the path of coordination offered in Article 62 of
the CCTB Proposal differs from the solution in Article 63
of the CCTB Proposal as regards third states. Article 63 of
the CCTB Proposal states: ‘The question whether an
entity that is located in a third country is transparent or
not shall be determined according to the law of the Member
State of the taxpayer’ (emphasis added).120 Therefore,
although this provision could, in principle, be interpreted
as a rule that grants priority to the characterization rules
in the Member States where the investors are located,
or – more precisely – where they are tax residents, in
the author’s opinion it is not properly a coordination rule.
Therefore, if Article 63 of the CCTB Proposal is applied,
it will still generate cases of hybrids and reverse hybrid
entities.
3.3.3.2 Spanish Coordination Practice: Other
Hybrid Entity Mismatches
As already emphasized in section 3.1.3.2, the Spanish
administrative interpretation of its domestic tax charac-
terization rules resembles a coordination rule.121 This
coordination appears to grant supremacy to the tax char-
acterization of the source state in all those cases where a
foreign hybrid entity makes a payment to its Spanish
investors.122 Nonetheless, in all other cases (e.g. when
Spanish investors controlling a foreign hybrid entity
make deductible payments to it or when a foreign hybrid
entity or a reverse foreign hybrid receives deductible
payments from a party in a third state in a triangular
case), the Spanish authoritative interpretation comes clo-
ser to a coordination rule granting supremacy to tax
characterization rules in the home state of the relevant
entity.
The latter situation can be illustrated using the facts in
Figure 17 as regards Scenario 2 and Scenario 3 referred to
hybrid entities.123 For this purpose, simply assume that
State A is Spain and, therefore, ACo is a Spanish company.
All the other facts remain the same.
Figure 22 Spanish Administrative Practice and Hybrid
Entities
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Notes
116 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Corporate Tax Base, COM (2016) 685 final, (25 Oct. 2016), Art. 62(1).
117 For a general analysis of the CCTB, see D. Gutmann & E. Raingeard de la Blétière, CC(C)TB and International Taxation, 26 EC Tax Rev. 5 (2017).
118 European Commission, supra n. 116, Art. 4(1) – Definition of resident.
119 E.g. Art. 9a ATAD 2 (analysed at s. 3.2.3.3).
120 European Commission, supra n. 116, Art. 63.
121 Taking a similar position, see Jiménez-Valladolid de L’Hotellerie-Fallois & Vega Borrego, supra n. 46. See also Mosquera Mouriño, supra n. 46; Parada, supra n. 3, at 157–162.
122 See s. 3.1.3.2.
123 See s. 3.3.2.1.
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In both scenarios Spain will follow the tax character-
ization of BSub in State B (i.e. the home state).
Therefore, if ACo (a Spanish company) makes a deduc-
tible payment of interest to BSub, the tax treatment of
BSub as a taxable entity in State B will be followed by
Spain. That is, Spain will indeed regard BSub as a
taxable entity. This means not only that the hybrid
entity mismatch will completely disappear, but also
that the outcome of the hybrid transaction will be a
deduction/inclusion of income, which should also satisfy
those concerned with single taxation.124 Similarly,
when BSub receives deductible payments from a party
in a third state, Spain will regard BSub (i.e. the reci-
pient) as a taxable entity. In other words, no hybrid
entity mismatch will arise and the outcome of the
transaction should again leave sceptics and non-sceptics
of single taxation equally satisfied.125 This results
resemble Scenarios 2 and 3 in section 3.3.2.1.
The cases involving reverse hybrid entities are illu-
strated below considering three scenarios: (1) deductible
interest payments received by a reverse hybrid entity, (2)
deductible interest payments made by a reverse hybrid
entity (controlled by a Spanish investors) to a party in a
third state and (3) deductible interest payments made by a
reverse hybrid entity to its Spanish owner, which controls
the payee entity.
As to Scenario 1, the effect of the Spanish adminis-
trative practice is precisely that illustrated in Figure
18. That is, BSub will be regarded as a tax transparent
entity in Spain and State C, and reliance on CFC rules
to counteract the hybrid entity mismatch will become
unnecessary, as the interest payments will flow
through BSub until the sole owner in State A (ACo).
This could also ensure that the interest payments are
recognized as income in one state, which proves again
that coordination can also be very effective in achiev-
ing a single tax result.126 Similarly, in Scenario 2, the
effect of the Spanish administrative practice is pre-
cisely that illustrated in Figure 19, that is, BSub
will be regarded as a tax transparent entity in Spain
and State C. Therefore, a deduction for the interest
payments will be allowed in Spain, while such interest
will be recognized as income in State C.127 Finally, in
Scenario 3, the outcome of the Spanish administrative
practice will be very similar to that illustrated in
Figure 20, that is, BSub will be regarded as tax
transparent entity in Spain and in State B. Therefore,
the hybrid entity mismatch disappears. Accordingly,
the entire loan transaction between ACo and BSub will
be disregarded for tax purposes.
As a result, therefore, one could conclude that the
Spanish approach eliminates the possibilities for mis-
matches as regards the tax characterization of a relevant
foreign entity (‘foreign’ from a Spanish perspective).
However, it still leaves open possibilities for mismatches
when Spanish entities are characterized in a different
manner by a foreign state. Such an outcome could none-
theless be avoided if a similar coordination rule were to be
applied worldwide, which is indeed the ultimate aim of
this proposal for coordination.128
Figure 23 Spanish Administrative Practice and Reverse Hybrid Entities
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124 Even though this author has already argued that ‘effective single taxation’ cannot be ensured, because it ultimately depends of the levels of income and expenses of BSub. See
e.g. supra n. 13 & 104.
125 However, effective single taxation in this case will again depend on the level of income and expenses of ACo. See e.g. supra n. 13 & 104.
126 However, this author has also emphasized some concerns as regards ensuring ‘effective single taxation, which will ultimately depend on the level of income and expenses of
ACo in State A. See e.g. supra n. 104.
127 The author still assumes the same facts of Figure 19, i.e. CSub1 is a taxable entity in State C. Otherwise, it is evident that income will be recognized at the level of its
partners either in State C or elsewhere, depending on whether these are legal entities (taxable or transparent) or individuals.
128 Parada, supra n. 3, at 162.
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4 IMPLEMENTATION AND OTHER ISSUES
This section, which stresses some implementation and
other issues regarding the proposals explored above, is
divided into two parts. The first part reinforces the idea
that only a uniform and worldwide implementation of a
coordination rule – granting supremacy to the tax char-
acterization in either the source state, the residence state
or home state – could ensure true success. Likewise, it
argues that only one of these single proposals could be
implemented worldwide in order to ensure that com-
plexity and transaction costs are indeed reduced. The
second part of this section turns the analysis of some
specific open questions as regards each of the proposals
analysed so far.
4.1 Uniform and Worldwide Implementation
As already emphasized, the alternatives analysed in this
article have been presented in a neutral way, i.e. without
necessarily disclosing the preferences of the author for one
or another. Accordingly, they share the common charac-
teristic of being exclusive. That is, only one of them
should ultimately and uniformly be implemented world-
wide. This is particularly critical if complexity and trans-
action costs are to be reduced under any of these
alternatives.129
As to the implementation itself, in the author’s opi-
nion, the only possible way to guarantee a successful
worldwide implementation of a coordination rule – any
of those proposed here – would be through recommen-
dations, i.e. in a very similar way as the OECD linking
rules were promoted. However, this is not an easy task,
especially because it demands a complete switch in the
way hybrid entity mismatches are understood.130
Indeed, as has been widely analysed elsewhere, the
OECD approach to issues concerning hybrid and reverse
hybrid entities follows a path that is entirely different
from that of coordination.131 This approach, which has
been criticized for being too consequentialist,132 starts
from the basis of recommending domestic rules that are
based on linking the tax outcomes resulting from
hybrid entity transactions.133 In particular, the OECD
domestic recommendations view economic double non-
taxation as the core of the problem regarding hybrid
entity mismatches. Such an approach relegates the tax
characterization of entities, i.e. the true reason for the
existence of hybrid and reverse hybrid entities, to the
metaphorical backyard.134 Therefore, a recommendation
that would start from the basis of coordination must
have, at a minimum, the support of the OECD mem-
bers, which appears to be, in principle, an impossible
task.
Another means of implementing any of these alterna-
tives could be through the use of supranational law that
would affect a wide group of countries, e.g. the European
Union. This idea is neither novel nor the sole province of
this author, and has already been extensively analysed.135
However, the author is rather pessimistic as regards its
potential impact. First, the limited regional scope of such
a proposal is rather evident and could not ensure a global
solution.136 Second, the European Commission has unfor-
tunately demonstrated in the past that by even having the
chance to deviate from the OECD linking rules, adopting
perhaps a more fundamental approach as regards hybrid
entity mismatches, it has finally succumbed to political
pressure.137 This is also a demonstration of the true role
played by the OECD in matters concerning international
coordination, especially when such an idea has originated
from within the OECD.
4.2 Open Questions as Regards the Proposals
Despite the fact that coordination offers a very positive
perspective in order to deal with hybrid entity mis-
matches, not all is a bed of roses. All three alternatives
analysed in this article still leave open questions as regards
their separate implementation and efficacy. These ques-
tions are analysed below.
Notes
129 The high level of complexity and transaction costs is a sound critique as regards the OECD linking rules. However, this critique could also be extended to these proposals for
coordination if they are all implemented at once and as three alternatives that countries might opt for. Such an idea would scarcely contribute to simplicity and ease of
administration, ultimately elevating the transaction costs for both taxpayers and tax administrations. For a critique of the OECD linking rules, see Parada, supra n. 1.
130 OECD, Action 2: 2015 Final Report, supra n. 2.
131 E.g. Parada, supra n. 1. See also Parada, supra n. 3, at 277–352.
132 Parada, supra n. 1.
133 Although not strictly analysed in this article because of the nature of domestic recommendations, the OECD proposes the implementation of domestic rules that primarily
deny a deduction if the relevant income is not included as ordinary income in the hands of the recipient in the other country, i.e. a ‘primary response’, or tax the income that
was not taxed in the hand of the recipient originally, i.e. a ‘defensive rule’. These rules are presented to the public as linking rules. OECD, Action 2: 2015 Final Report, supra
n. 2, at 49–66.
134 Parada, supra n. 3.
135 Fibbe, supra n. 4, at 293–384.
136 For some attempts at coordination of the tax characterization of entities in the European Union, see Art. 10(1) of the Proposal for ATAD, supra n. 30. For an analysis of this
provision, see s. 3.1.3.1. See also more recently, Art. 9a ATAD 2 (reverse hybrid entities), supra n. 89. For an analysis of this provision, see s. 3.2.3.3.
137 This is evident in the final adoption of linking rules in the ATAD 1. See European Commission, supra n. 31, Art. 9. Taking a similar position, see also Fibbe & Stevens, supra
n. 36.
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4.2.1 Supremacy of the Tax Characterization Rules
of the Source State
There are three significant open questions as regards the
worldwide application of a rule granting supremacy to the
tax characterization rules of the source state.
First, there is a question concerning the determination
of the ‘source state’. At first glance, the rule appears to be
easy to apply. However, the determination of the source of
income is not always an easy task and in some cases could
result in multiple sources.138 A reasonable question in this
regard therefore concerns which source state should be
considered for purposes of the coordination rule. This
could certainly relativize the positive impact of this
proposal.
Second, an important question concerns the implicit
‘coherence’ underlying hybrid entity mismatches and the
application of a coordination rule granting supremacy to
the tax characterization of entities at source.139 Indeed,
one could argue that it is the country which creates the
mismatch that is the first one called to react in case of a
hybrid entity mismatch.140 That is, it would be the
country the tax characterization rules of which differ
from those where the entity is established which should
indeed react.141 Such an idea might coincide when a
hybrid entity makes a payment to its investors abroad,
i.e. the source state and entity’s establishment country
would coincide in such a case.142 However, in all other
cases, i.e. when investors makes deductible payments to a
hybrid entity abroad, or when a hybrid entity or a reverse
hybrid receives deductible payments from a party in a
third country in a triangular case, the source state and
the state of establishment of the relevant entity will not
coincide.143 This would imply that following an
approach which grants supremacy to the tax character-
ization rules in the source state would not necessarily be
‘coherent’ with the fact of placing the burden of reaction
on the country generating the mismatch.144 Yet, this
idea could be argued against if hybrid entity mismatches
are understood as a simple and inevitable consequence of
the autonomous tax characterization rules applied by
countries around the world.145 This idea is not wrong.
However, it places the issue of hybrid entity mismatches
in a permanent state of inertia.146 That is, no country
should react to the disparities and everyone should sim-
ply accept them as a sunk cost of cross-border
activities.147
Third, a rule granting supremacy to the tax character-
ization rules in the source state could also raise questions
as regards legal certainty, especially in those cases invol-
ving a reverse hybrid entity receiving a payment from a
party in a third state different from the investors’ state
and from the entity’s state of establishment.148 For exam-
ple assumes that a coordination rule granting supremacy
to the tax characterization rules of the source state is
applied and that a deductible payment is made from a
party in a third state to a reverse hybrid located in another
state and controlled by another entity in a different state,
too.149 As the source state will never coincide with the
state from which the entity is formally or legally estab-
lished, i.e. supremacy to the tax characterization rules of
the source state will always imply that the tax character-
ization of the relevant third (source) country will prevail.
Such a result might be questionable from a legal certainty
perspective, especially because the rule will be triggered
only when the owners abroad treat the tax transparent
entity as a taxable one, which might leave investors in an
uncertain position when they decide to carry out business
Notes
138 The issues regarding the determination of source have been largely discussed in literature. See e.g. L. Lokken, What Is This Thing Called Source?, 37(3) Int’l Tax J. 21–26
(2011). See also F. Vanistendael, Reinventing Source Taxation, 6(3) EC Tax Rev. 152–161 (1997). For a tax treaty approach as regards issues on source, see J. Avery Jones et al.,
Tax Treaty Problems Relating to Source, Brit. Tax Rev. 3 (1998).
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‘Coherence’ is indeed the core of Action 2. As stated by the OECD: ‘The recommendations set out in this report are intended to operate as a comprehensive and coherent package
of measures to neutralize mismatches that arise from the use of hybrid instruments and entities without imposing undue burdens on taxpayers and tax administrations’
(emphasis added). OECD, Action 2: 2015 Final Report, supra n. 2, at 94.
140 Lüdicke, supra n. 1, at 317.
141 Parada, supra n. 3, at 359.
142 Ibid., at 356–357.
143 Ibid.
144 Ibid., at 360.
145 Explaining the rather unclear concept of ‘tax arbitrage’, Rosenbloom argues that taxpayers can legitimately arrange their affairs in order to achieve double non-taxation and
using for this purpose uncoordinated tax rules among jurisdictions. Rosenbloom, supra n. 5, at 116. Also taking the same position, see Kane, supra n. 5, at 89. See also T.
Edgar, Corporate Income Tax Coordination as a Response to International Tax Competition and International Tax Arbitrage, 51 Can. Tax J. 3 (2003); D. Ring, One Nation Among
Many: Policy Implications of Cross-Border Tax Arbitrage, 44(1) B. C. L. Rev. (2002); J. Roin, Taxation without Coordination, 31 J. Legal Stud. 1, Part 2 (2002); T. Gresik, The
Taxing Task of Taxing Transnationals, 39(3) J. Econ. Lit. (2001). In contrast, see Dell’Anese, supra n. 5. See also R. Avi-Yonah, Tax Competition, Tax Arbitrage and the
International Tax Regime, 61(4) Bull. Int’l Tax’n (2007); T. Rosembuj, International Tax Arbitrage, 39(4) Intertax (2011); J. Prebble, Exploiting Form in Avoidance by
International Tax Arbitrage: Arguments Towards a Unifying Hypothesis of Taxation Law, 17(1) Asia-Pac. Tax Bull. (2011).
146 As argued by Cooper: ‘The problem is that the driving force which generates hybrids, i.e. inconsistent policy choices made by national governments, is almost ubiquitous’.
Cooper, supra n. 1, at 334.
147 In contrast, this article starts from the hypothesis that a reaction is needed. However, this should start from properly distinguishing the problems. See s. 2, Hypothesis 2.
148 See ss 3.1.2.1 & 3.1.2.2.
149 See s. 3.1.2.2, Figures 4 and 5.
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through a tax transparent entity rather than a
corporation.150
4.2.2 Supremacy of the Tax Characterization Rules
of the Residence State
The option to grant supremacy to the tax characterization
rules in the residence state of the majority of the owners of
a relevant entity is not completely without its flaws,
either. Indeed, it still raises critical questions as regards
legal certainty, especially with respect to the treatment of
minority shareholders (owners).
The proposed wording of the rule starts from the
basis that the state of establishment of the relevant
entity should align its tax characterization with that
granted in the country where ‘[ … ] more than 50% of
its owners – directly or indirectly by shares or voting
rights – are tax residents [ … ]’.151 This recharacteriza-
tion for tax purposes of the entity in the country where
it is established, triggered in particular by the percen-
tage of ownership held in that entity (more than 50%)
could raise reasonable questions as regards legal cer-
tainty, especially by those who are not part of the
50%.152 This question has already been raised as
regards similar rules used to support this proposal,
such as the anti-hybrid rules in Denmark, where it is
clear that the rule equally affects all shareholders once
an entity has been recharacterized as a taxable entity.153
If the proposed rule is therefore interpreted in the same
direction, it would appear to be disproportionate and
disadvantageous for the interests of minority share-
holders, and it could give rise to significant internal
conflicts and negative consequences for the normal
functioning of a business.154 In the worst case scenario,
it could influence the decisions of domestic investors to
carry out business based on the residents of the foreign
investors and the tax treatment granted to the entity in
their country.155 This result would not only be absurd,
but could also generate important barriers for the
economic development of a state.156 A different
approach could be that followed by Recommendation
5.2 of the OECD BEPS Action 2 Final Report, which
provides a similar rule, although without making any
reference to percentages of ownership in the relevant
entity.157 Such an approach, however, will turn over the
argument of certainty now as regards the majority
being subject to the tax characterization of the entity
triggered by a minority of shareholders.158
Other still raising questions as regards this proposal
refers to the legal effect once the recharacterization is
triggered.159 For example would the normal rule that
the owner of a fiscally transparent entity is deemed to
own also a proportionate part of the entity’s assets and
liabilities, not be applicable after the recharacterization?
In other words, would the recharacterization imply that
the owners are deemed to have an ownership in a separate
entity? If that is the case, any disposal of an interest in the
relevant entity would be regarded as a ‘sale of shares’, the
capital gains from which might not necessarily be taxed in
the hands of non-residents.160 Accordingly, a rollover
principle at the level of the owners of the entity should
be considered in order to ensure that the owners are
generally not taxed on any gains on the assets held by
the entity as a consequence of the recharacterization.161
That is, the owners of the recharacterized entity should be
deemed to have acquired their ownership interest in the
entity at a price equal to the tax value of the assets and
liabilities held by the entity at the time of the recharac-
terization. Moreover, assets and liabilities held by an
entity that is recharacterized should be regarded as having
been acquired at the same time that the owner acquired
them and at a similar price, i.e. a rollover principle at the
entity level.162
Finally, some questions could still arise as regards
dividend distributions from the recharacterized entity
and the potential application of withholding taxes in the
state where the recharacterized entity is establish. Indeed,
if the tax transparent entity is now regarded as a taxable
entity, the distribution of profits made to non-residents
Notes
150 Ibid.
151 See s. 3.2.1.
152 Although beyond the scope of this article, it could also raise questions at the level of tax treaties, especially as regards Art. 24(5) of the OECD Model.
153 Møllin Ottosen & Nørremark, supra n. 61, at 514. For an analysis, see also Parada, supra n. 3, at 171–172.
154 Parada, supra n. 3, at 170 (Figure 19).
155 Ibid., at 171.
156 Ibid.
157 OECD, Action 2: 2015 Final Report, supra n. 2, at 64–65.
158 See s. 3.2.3.2.
159 Some of these concerns are also emphasized as regards the Danish rules. Møllin Ottosen & Nørremark, supra n. 61, at 514–515.
160 This is particularly true in the case of two states having a tax treaty and applying Art. 13(5) of the OECD Model to the ‘sale of shares’, as taxing rights are allocated
exclusively to the residence state.
161 Møllin Ottosen & Nørremark, supra n. 61, at 514–515 (as regards the Danish anti-hybrid rules).
162 Ibid.
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should, in principle, be subject to withholding taxes.163 If
no distribution takes place, concerns might still arise as
regards the application of CFC rules in the state of the
investors, as the entity could now qualify as a CFC.164 In
the author’s opinion, unless a specific exception applies,
both withholding taxes and CFC rules should affect the
distributed and undistributed profits, respectively.
4.2.3 Supremacy of the Tax Characterization Rules
of the Home State
Unlike the other two proposals, a rule granting supremacy
to the tax characterization in the home state of the rele-
vant entity, i.e. where the entity is legally and formally
organized, do not raise issues as regards either legal cer-
tainty or the determination of the source of the income.165
However, such a rule still possesses an inherent disadvan-
tage, namely the potential for a cherry-picking effect.
The proposal calls for aligning the tax characteriza-
tion of an entity according to that given in the entity’s
country of establishment. This could create an inap-
propriate incentive to set up entities in a state where
the tax treatment is more favourable from a tax plan-
ning perspective, ultimately incentivizing jurisdictional
cherry-picking and bringing with it the incentive for
countries to take steps to attract certain business struc-
tures. Nevertheless, this is not entirely true. For exam-
ple in all those cases where a hybrid entity is involved,
either receiving or making deductible payments, a coor-
dination rule granting supremacy to the tax character-
ization rules in the home state would imply that all
countries involved will treat the relevant entity as a
taxable entity.166 Therefore, those payments will be
recognized as income somewhere, independently of
whether effective taxation ultimately applies.167 This
can be clearly seen in Figure 17, where the hybrid
entity mismatch disappears after the application of the
coordination rule, achieving also the outcome pursued
by BEPS Action 2.168 In this scenario, therefore, it is
difficult to conclude that cherry picking will truly be a
problem in practice.
A similar conclusion can be reached in the case of
reverse hybrid entities receiving a payment from a party
in a third country, such as the case illustrated in Figure
18.169 In this case, the application of a coordination rule
granting supremacy to the tax characterization rules in the
home state would imply that the hybrid entity mismatch
will disappear, i.e. the relevant entity is now a tax trans-
parent entity in the eyes of the three states involved and
the reliance on CFC rules to solve the mismatch becomes
unnecessary. The outcomes will also be aligned, as the
country of the investors will be able to recognize the
income received by the tax transparent entity (no longer
a reverse hybrid), independently of course of whether
effective taxation ultimately applies in that state.170
Likewise, as demonstrated in Figure 21, the mismatch is
eliminated and the outcomes are also aligned, allowing
the recognition of income received by the tax transparent
entity.171 Therefore, and once again, the risk of cherry
picking in those cases should not represent a true concern
in practice, especially because the outcomes achieved after
the application of the rule would be a disincentive to such
conduct.
However, a different conclusion can be reached in the
cases involving reverse hybrid entities, especially when a
reverse hybrid entity makes a deductible payment either
to a third-country entity or to the country of the inves-
tors. As noted in Figure 19 and in Figure 20, such
situations could create benefits (deductions) that were
not available before the application of the coordination
rule or they could disregard a transaction not originally
disregarded.172 These outcomes might then wrongly
encourage taxpayers towards cherry-picking conduct,
which in those situations could be a true concern. This
conduct could nonetheless be neutralized if the coordina-
tion rule is suspended in all those triangular cases where
a reverse hybrid is making a payment to an entity in a
third country or to the country of its investors.173 Such a
suspension should, in any case, be interpreted as a
Notes
163 If a distribution from the recharacterized entity takes place, it should be classified as a dividend, and potentially subject to withholding taxes. This issue is not necessarily a
matter of concern in the EU, because of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive. However, other countries outside the EU still apply withholding tax to dividends. Cooper, taking
the example of Australia, also stresses this issue. Cooper, supra n. 1, at 348.
164 This could give rise to new situations of double taxation. However, most of them should be easily overcome with proper domestic relief. See the example of US domestic tax
relief at supra n. 14.
165 Parada, supra n. 3, at 353 et seq.
166 See s. 3.3.2.1.
167 The author has repeatedly argued this. See e.g. supra n. 104.
168 See s. 3.3.2.1.
169 Ibid.
170 Supra n. 104.
171 See s. 3.3.2.2.
172 This was originally emphasized by this author. Parada, supra n. 3, at 366–368.
173 The author calls for a switch-off of the rule in s. 3.3.2.2. See also Parada, supra n. 3, at 367 and 368. For an explanation of the effects of switching-off the rule and the
application of tax treaties, see Parada supra n. 3, at 395–396.
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contradiction or as a defect of the proposed coordination
rule for those two triangular cases.174 Moreover, one
should also consider that the outcomes of these triangu-
lar transactions were not seen as problematic before the
application of this proposed coordination rule,175 which
should be a plus for considering the introduction of this
exception in order also to control a potential cherry-
picking problem. However, and once again, this solution
could be effective only to the extent it is applied
worldwide.
5. CONCLUSION
This article has offered a more fundamental approach to
hybrid entity mismatches. This approach starts from the
basis of refocusing attention exclusively on the disparate
tax characterization of entities, disregarding therefore the
matching of tax outcomes (in particular the double non-
taxation outcome) as the central element in the design of
domestic anti-hybrid entity rules. For this purpose, three
specific alternatives were explored based on coordination
in the tax characterization of entities, and the results are
indeed promising.
Granting supremacy to the tax characterization rules in
the source state has proven to be a very feasible solution
when a hybrid entity makes deductible payments to a related
investor or when a reverse hybrid entity receives deductible
payments from a party in a third state. However, some
questions still arise in the cases where hybrid entities receive
payments either from their controlling investors or from a
party in a third country, and when reverse hybrid entities
make deductible payments either to their controlling inves-
tors or to a party in a third country. However, nothing
prevents those countries from preventing the application of
a coordination rule granting supremacy to the tax character-
ization rules in the source state in all those specific cases,
especially considering that these cases did not generate inter-
national concern either pre-BEPS or post-BEPS.
Accordingly, granting supremacy to the tax character-
ization rules in the residence state also appears to be a very
noteworthy solution to cases involving hybrid entities
making deductible payments to a related investor or
receiving payments from a party in a third state. A con-
cern might nonetheless still be raised in the cases of
hybrid entities receiving payments from a related control-
ling investor, especially due to the non-deduction/non-
inclusion outcome. This concern is nonetheless irrelevant
from the perspective of the application of a coordination
rule, which does not attend to double non-taxation as the
central element of its design. Similarly, a positive result
could also be achieved in the case of reverse hybrid entities
receiving a payment from a party in a third state. In this
case, coordination at residence not only solves the hybrid
entity mismatch, but also avoids exclusive reliance on
CFC rules in the country of the investor in order to ensure
the recognition of income. This outcome should thus also
satisfy those commentators more inclined in the defense of
international single taxation. As to reverse hybrid entity
structures, coordination at residence could also be a very
positive solution in cases of reverse hybrid entities receiv-
ing a payment from a party in a third state different from
the state of investors, or making a payment to the state of
their investors. Nevertheless, some concerns could still be
raised in cases of a reverse hybrid entity making a deduc-
tible payment to a third state different from the investors,
especially when this third state treats the reverse hybrid as
a tax transparent entity. In such a case, some international
tax scholars might regard granting supremacy to the tax
characterization rules in the residence state with scepti-
cism, as it will generate a non-taxation outcome.
However, as emphasized in this article, granting supre-
macy to the tax characterization rules in the residence
state starts from the basis that coordination in the tax
characterization of entities (rather than matching tax out-
comes) is the central element of the proposal.
Notably, both a coordination rules granting supremacy
to the tax characterization rules in the source state and
coordination rule granting supremacy to the residence
state’s tax characterization rules are proven to be effective
also in practice.176
Separate mention should be made of the proposal to
grant supremacy to the tax characterization rules in the
home state. This proposal, which was just recently elabo-
rated and presented in literature, appears to be a very
attractive and effective option. First, its operational
mechanism is very simple and the use of the home state
as the ‘coordination state’ also appears coherently justified,
as hybrid entity mismatches are the result of a different
characterization of an entity when compared to the char-
acterization given in its country of legal or formal orga-
nization, i.e. the home state. Second, the proposal assumes
a more honest approach in its scope, as it applies to all
those cases where there are disparities between two or
more countries with respect to the characterization of
the same entity. However, this proposal, like the other
two, is not all a bed of roses. Indeed, the proposal still
leaves open questions regarding its effectiveness. These
questions refer specifically to some undesirable effects
Notes
174 See s. 3.3.2.2.
175 Both schemes in Figures 19 and 20 in this article do not generate a deduction/non-inclusion outcome. Therefore, the OECD did not consider them problematic at all. The
OECD approach to hybrid entity mismatches is indeed ‘consequentialist’, i.e. it starts from the basis that a hybrid entity structure must generate a determined outcome in
order to be counteracted. For a critical view of the OECD approach, see Parada, supra n. 1. See also Cooper, supra n. 1 and Lüdicke, supra n. 1.
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that the application of the rule could generate, particu-
larly potential double taxation issues in the case where a
hybrid entity receives a payment, and where a tax benefit
is granted or a transaction is disregarded solely because of
the application of the rule. Yet, as mentioned throughout
this article, a coordinated application of the coordination
rule and CFC rules in order to avoid potential double
taxation issues involving hybrid entities receiving pay-
ments, first; and second, a switch-off of the proposed
rule in the case of tax benefits or disregarded transactions
resulting exclusively from the application of the rule,
could provide a better scenario. Still, a worldwide,
consistent and uniform implementation of this rule is
crucial to ensure its practical positive impact.
Finally, none of the alternatives analysed in this article
has presumed to be presented as perfect solutions, let
alone unassailable ones, but rather to serve as a guide to
reorientate the debate surrounding hybrid entity mis-
matches towards what really matters. Indeed, reorganizing
one’s thoughts on this matter is the first step in order to
avoid a consequentialist approach, as regards both the
distinction of the problems and the proposals designed
to counteract them. As shown here, coordination is a
feasible and serious path to consider.
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